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Abstract
Based on worldly experience, most people would agree that firms are hi-
erarchically organized, and that pay tends to increase as one moves up the
hierarchy. But how this hierarchical structure affects income distribution
has not been widely studied. To remedy this situation, this paper presents
a new model of income distribution that explores the effects of social hi-
erarchy. This ‘hierarchy model’ takes the limited available evidence on the
structure of firm hierarchies, and generalizes it to create a large-scale simu-
lation of the hierarchical structure of the United States economy. Using this
model, I conduct the first quantitative investigation of hierarchy’s effect on
income distribution. I find that hierarchy plays a dominant role in shap-
ing the tail of US income distribution. The model suggests that hierarchy
is responsible for generating the power-law scaling of top incomes. More-
over, I find that hierarchy can be used to unify the study of personal and
functional income distribution, as well as to understand historical trends in
income inequality.
⇤Author contact: blairfix@gmail.com
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Introduction 3
1 Introduction
The field of income distribution modeling is in need of new ideas. Ever since
Pareto [1] discovered the power law scaling of top incomes and wealth, theorists
have sought generative models for creating income distributions. In this regard,
the field has beenwildly successful. An impressive array of models now exist that
can generate, from simple principles, observed distributions of income [2–21].
The problem is that this outward empirical success masks underlying assump-
tions that often have little to do with reality. To echo Leontief, “what is really
needed, in most cases, is a very difficult and seldom very neat assessment and
verification of these assumptions in terms of observed facts” [22].
This paper seeks to take the field of income distribution modeling in a new
direction. In my view, the goal of an income distribution model should not be
to generate income distributions from first principles. Such models are best
left to physics, where there are actual ‘first principles’ (the laws of physics).
Instead, a good income distribution model should be a tool for dissecting income
distributions. A good model should be a tool for making generalizations from
scattered and piecemeal observations of the real-world. A good model should be
a tool for understanding connections to other branches of theory. A good model
should be a tool for unifying ideas, and for understanding history.
A Focus on Hierarchy
In this paper, I build and test a model with the explicit purpose of understanding
how social hierarchy affects income distribution. I am interested in hierarchy
for a number of reasons. First, the use of hierarchy to distribute resources is
ubiquitous among social animals. Virtually all social animals form dominance
hierarchies, or ‘pecking orders’ [23–28]. Among such animals, hierarchical rank
plays a key role in gaining access to resources, particularly sexual mates [29–33].
Given our evolutionary heritage, it seems quite reasonable to hypothesize that
hierarchy plays a role in shaping resource distribution among humans.1
1 Lewontin and Levins note that “struggles for legitimacy between political ideologies even-
tually come down to struggles over what constitutes human nature” [34]. Although I think the
human proclivity for forming hierarchies likely has an evolutionary basis, this does not mean
that I think that hierarchy represents a ‘natural order’. Rather, the evolutionary evidence simply
suggests that we have an instinct for forming hierarchy. This says nothing about how society
ought to be. Much of what we consider social progress consists of suppressing instinctual behav-
ior. The decline of human violence from the evolutionary background rate is perhaps the best
example of such progress [35,36].
Introduction 4
A second reason for my interest in hierarchy is that it offers a simple way
of studying the class structure of society. Many social scientists have proposed
that income distribution is connected to class structure [37–47]. However, there
is no consensus on what, exactly, a ‘class’ is. Nor is there agreement on which
classes are important for shaping income distribution. Hierarchy is useful for
studying class structure because it is abstract and generalizable. A hierarchy is
really just a particular form of network— one that has a tree-like structure [48].
Because human hierarchies represent a chain of command, they offer a natural
way of grouping individuals by authority (or what I call hierarchical power). Do
individuals with more hierarchical power earn more money? How does this
affect income distribution? These are questions that I seek to answer.
Lastly, I am interested in hierarchy because it is conspicuously absent from
mainstream theory, and thus its role in shaping income distribution is poorly
understood. The vast majority of income distribution models are atomistic —
they focus solely on individuals. I believe this approach is misguided. While it
would be a triumph of science if we could explain complex social structure in
terms of the actions of individuals, we are very far from this goal. This ‘bottom-
up’ approach requires a highly accurate model of human behavior — something
that we are hopeless far from having.
The Model
The hierarchy model that I construct in this paper is a different sort of beast
than the typical economic model. The hierarchy model is not built on micro
principles. It is not dynamic, and it is not agent based. Instead, it is a tool
of necessity. There is simply too little empirical evidence about how hierarchy
shapes income to draw conclusions directly from the data. I use the hierarchy
model as a tool for making generalizations from the scattered evidence that does
exist. It is essentially an extrapolation (albeit a complex one). The model fits
trends to a small sample of firm-level data, and then generalizes these trends to
create a large-scale simulation of the hierarchical structure of the United States
economy. This simulated data can then be used to study how hierarchy affects
income.
Goals
I use the hierarchy model to pursue two goals — one that is quite modest and
one that is admittedly bold. The first (modest) goal, is to quantify the role that
hierarchy plays in shaping income distribution in the United States. The second,
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admittedly bold, goal is to use hierarchy as a unification mechanism. I investigate
how hierarchy can be used to unify both the study of personal and functional
income, and our understanding of historical trends in income inequality.
Summary of Findings
The general finding in this paper is that the hierarchy model provides a rich
framework (no pun intended) for understanding the behavior of top incomes.
The hierarchy model explains why US income distribution has a power law tail,
and it provides a tantalizing way of linking personal and functional income dis-
tribution. Lastly, hierarchical redistribution seems to be a fruitful way to under-
stand historical changes in top income shares.
Key Results
1. Hierarchy links top incomes (and wealth) to large institutions: Top
earning US executives, as well as the wealthiest Americans, work for (or own)
firms that are much larger than those of the general population. The hierarchy
model reproduces this effect.
2. Hierarchy shapes top incomes. The model demonstrates a clear division
between the body and the tail of the income distribution. The body of the dis-
tribution is primarily determined by between-firm income dispersion. However,
the tail of the distribution is almost completely determined by hierarchy. The
model reproduces the power law scaling of the top 1% of US incomes. I show
that this is purely an effect of hierarchy.
3. Hierarchy links personal and functional income: Building on the work of
Nitzan and Bichler [49], I test the hypothesis that being a ‘capitalist’ is a function
of hierarchical power. Specifically, I propose that the fraction of income coming
from capitalist sources scales with hierarchical power. A model implementing
this hypothesis accurately predicts how capitalist income share increases with
income size in the United States. The same model also reproduces the size
distribution of US capitalist income, as well as the capitalist share of national
income.
4. Changes in hierarchical pay explain historical changes in inequality. I
test the hypothesis that the recent explosion in US top income shares can be
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explained in terms of differential gains to hierarchical rank and power. By vary-
ing the rate at which income scales with hierarchical rank, I am able to use the
model to reproduce historical trends. The model is able to replicate not only
the increasing share of the top 1%, but also the increasing pay of top CEOs.
The same model, when used in tandem with the capitalist gradient hypothe-
sis, is able replicate (with 75% accuracy) the observed relation between US top
income share and the dividend share of national income.
Paper Layout
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. In section 2, I review
the basic characteristics of the hierarchy model. (A detailed, technical discussion
of the model’s algorithm can be found in the appendix). I then test the model
against various aspects of US income distribution. Having confirmed that the
hierarchy model gives sound results, I use it to estimate how hierarchy affects
US income distribution. In section 3, I investigate if hierarchy can be used to
unify the study of personal and functional income distribution. In section 4,
I investigate if hierarchy can be used to unify our understanding of historical
trends in income inequality.
2 A Hierarchy Model
The hierarchy model is based on the hypothesis that human institutions are
hierarchically organized, and that hierarchical power (authority over subordi-
nates) plays a key role in determining income. While this hypothesis is quite
radical by the standards of neoclassical economics, I am certainly not the first
scholar to suspect that power plays a role in income distribution (see, for in-
stance [37,42,45,49–61]).
The starting point for my approach is the seminal work of Herbert Simon
[62] and H.F Lydall [63]. In the late 1950s, Simon and Lydall both developed
simple models that focused on the branching structure of firm hierarchies. The
distinguishing feature of a branching hierarchy is that each superior has control
over multiple subordinates (see Fig. 1). This feature is important because it
distinguishes human hierarchies from the linear dominance hierarchies (pecking
orders) seen in animals. Within a linear hierarchy, there are as many ranks as
there are individuals. Consequently, there is no class structure. However, a
branching hierarchy naturally leads to a pyramid-shaped class system based on
hierarchical rank.
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Figure 1: A Branching Hierarchy
This figure shows an idealized branching hierarchy in which each superior has
two subordinates. This superior/subordinate ratio — often called the span
of control — can be used to mathematically describe the hierarchy. Starting
from the bottom rank, each consecutive rank decreases in size by a factor of
the span of control. Evidence from real-world firms suggests that the span of
control is not constant by rank, but instead tends to increase as one moves up
the hierarchy (see Appendix B).
Simon and Lydall both showed how branching hierarchical structure could
explain regularities in income distribution. Simon used a simple hierarchical
model of the firm to explain the observed scaling between CEO pay and firm sales
[64]. Lydall showed how firm hierarchy could lead to a power law distribution
of top incomes. Although promising, it seems that this work was largely ignored
by the economics profession. Soon after these papers were published, human
capital theory became the prevailing orthodoxy in personal income distribution
theory [65–67]. As a result, little work was done to explore the consequences
of hierarchical organization.
This paper draws on the work of Simon and Lydall, but updates their model
in light of recent empirical work. Both Simon and Lydall assumed a constant
span of control. (The span of control is the number of subordinates per superior).
Case study evidence (discussed in Appendix B) indicates that the span of control
is not constant. Rather, it tends to increase as onemoves up the hierarchy. Simon
and Lydall also assumed a constant ratio of average income between adjacent
hierarchical ranks. Again, case study evidence suggests that this is not quite
true. Like the span of control, the pay ratio between ranks also tends to increase
as one moves up the hierarchy.
Another key feature of my approach is that I take full advantage of modern
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computational power to build a large-scale, stochastic simulation. In contrast,
Simon and Lydall used simple analytic methods. Simulation allows investigation
that would otherwise be impossible with a purely analytic approach.
2.1 Modeling Goals and Methods
As I stated in the introduction, the goal of my modeling effort is not to generate
a distribution of income from first principles. Instead, the model is designed
to be a surrogate for data that does not exist. What do I mean by this? After
scouring the scientific literature, I have been able to find only a handful of studies
that document, with sufficient detail, the hierarchical structure of real-world
firms (see Appendix B). This paucity of data likely owes to two things. Firstly,
the discipline of economics is generally disinterested in hierarchy and power,
so there is little incentive to do empirical work on this topic. Secondly, firm
employment and payroll data is largely proprietary, meaning it is simply not
available to researchers unless they have an inside connection.
This lack of data means that it is virtually impossible to study the general
effects of hierarchy on income distribution solely by using the available case-
study evidence. The hierarchy model is designed to generate data that Iwishwas
available directly. The model takes the scant data that does exist, and fits trends
(and parameterized distributions) to it. I then use the model to extrapolate these
trends to a large-scale simulation of the economy. The resulting model is entirely
dependent on the input, firm-level data. I do not tune the model to reproduce
macro level results. The model output is purely what is implied by generalizing
the trends found in input data.
The model is built on a tripartite income classification scheme that allows
for three sources of income dispersion (see Fig. 2) :
Source 1: Income dispersion between hierarchical levels of each firm
(inter-hierarchical dispersion);
Source 2: Income dispersion within hierarchical levels of each firm
(intra-hierarchical dispersion);
Source 3: Income dispersion between different firms
(inter-firm dispersion).
Inter-firm and intra-hierarchical level dispersion are not explained by the model.
(In the jargon of economic modeling, these dispersion sources are exogenous).
In contrast, inter-hierarchical dispersion is partially explained by the model. It
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Figure 2: A Tripartite Division of Income Distribution
This figure illustrates the income distribution grouping scheme used by the hierarchy
model. The model allows for three sources of income dispersion. Inter-firm dispersion
consists of differences in (average) pay between firms. Within each firm, there are two
further sources of dispersion. Inter-hierarchical level dispersion consists of differences
in (average) pay between hierarchical levels, while intra-hierarchical level dispersion
consists of differences in pay within each hierarchical level.
is explained in the sense that it is not ex nihilo — this dispersion does not come
from nowhere. The model contains firms that have a specific hierarchical struc-
ture of employment and pay. However, the reason for this hierarchical struc-
ture is not explained by the model. Rather, hierarchical structure is determined
from regressions on case study data, in conjunction with firm-level data from
the Compustat and Execucomp databases.
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Modeling the United States
The model is designed to study the hierarchical structure of the US economy as
it was (on average) over the years 1992-2015. At the highest level of abstrac-
tion, the model has three parts. First, the model creates a firm size distribution
that dictates how many firms of a given size will exist. Second, for each firm
in this distribution, the model creates a hierarchical structure. This means the
model determines how many ranks will exist, and how many individuals will oc-
cupy each hierarchical rank. Lastly, the model uses each of the three dispersion
sources (outlined above) to stochastically generate an income for every individ-
ual in every firm. In a sense, everything else amounts to details about how each
of these steps is carried out. I review here the most important elements of each
step. A technical discussion can be found in the Appendix.
Step 1: Create a Firm Size Distribution. The first step of the model is to gen-
erate a distribution of firm sizes. The available evidence suggests that national
firm size distributions can be modeled by a power law [68–70]. Under this as-
sumption, the probability of finding a firm of size x is proportional to x ↵, where
↵ is a constant. I model the United States firm size distribution with 1 million
firms distributed according to a discrete power law distribution with exponent
↵= 2.01 (see Appendix E).
Step 2: Endow Firms with Hierarchical Structure. The hierarchy model cap-
tures only the aggregate hierarchical structure of firms. That is, I model the num-
ber of employees in each hierarchical level, not the exact chain of command. I
base the model on a number of recent case studies that have documented the
aggregate hierarchical structure of firms in various developed countries (see Ap-
pendix B). From this data, I make generalizations about the hierarchical struc-
ture of firms. The evidence suggests that the span of control (the ratio between
adjacent hierarchical levels) increases exponentially with hierarchical rank.
For simplicity, all firms in the model have the same hierarchical structure —
that is, they are governed by the same span of control function. However, since
there is a great deal of uncertainty in this function, I run the model many times.
Each different model run uses a slightly different span of control function, de-
termined by resampling from case study data. The result is that the hierarchical
structure of firms varies stochastically between different model runs, allowing
us to capture uncertainty in the underlying empirical data. For more details, see
Appendix D and E.
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Step 3: Endow Individuals with Income After each firm has a hierarchical
structure, we begin the most important part of the model, which is to assign ev-
ery individual an income. Because the model has three dispersion mechanisms,
this last step has three components, outlined below.
Step 3A: Generate Inter-Hierarchical Level Dispersion. In the model, hier-
archical pay is constructed from the bottom up. Starting from the bottom rank,
I define a function that determines the rate at which pay increases by hierarchi-
cal rank. This function is informed by case study data (see Appendix B). Unlike
hierarchical employment structure, each modeled firm is given a different hierar-
chical pay structure. The process of assigning different hierarchical pay structure
to each firm is heavily informed by firm-level data in the Compustat database.
(See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the Compustat data).
The basic idea is this: before running the full simulation, I fit the hierar-
chy model to Compustat data for real-world American firms. Compustat (in
conjunction with Execucomp) provides data on CEO pay, average pay, and firm
employment. Assuming the CEO occupies the top hierarchical level, we can
use this information to model the hierarchical pay structure of each Compus-
tat firm. Once this is complete, we have an indication of how hierarchical pay
should vary across firms. The model’s main simulation is then informed by this
variation. The result is a unique hierarchical pay structure for each firm. For
more details, see Appendix D and E.
Step 3B: Generate Inter-Firm Dispersion. I create inter-firm income disper-
sion by varying (average) pay in the bottom hierarchical level of each firm. This
variation is informed by firm-level data in the Compustat database. As discussed
in Step 3A, prior to running a full-scale simulation, I fit the model to firms in
the Compustat database. After having fit hierarchical pay, I use this information
to estimate how base-level pay varies across these firms. This variation then
informs the model’s main simulation. For more details, see Appendix D and E.
Step 3C: Generate Intra-Hierarchical Level Dispersion. The last step is to
model the income dispersion within the hierarchical levels of each firm. The
available case study evidence suggests that income dispersion within hierarchi-
cal levels is roughly constant across all hierarchical levels (see Appendix B). To
simplify the model, I further assume that intra-hierarchical level dispersion is
constant across all firms. Informed by case study data, I use a single parameter-
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Figure 3: A Landscape View of the Hierarchy Model
This figure visualizes the US hierarchy model as a landscape of three dimensional firms.
Each pyramid represents a single firm, with size indicating the number of employees
and height corresponding to the number of hierarchical levels. If you look closely, you
will see vertical lines corresponding to individuals. Income (relative to the median) is
indicated by color. This visualization has 20,000 firms — a small sample of the actual
model, which uses 1 million firms.
ized distribution to randomly generate income dispersion within all hierarchical
levels of every firm. For more details, see Appendix D and E.
Visualizing the US Hierarchy Model
From the brief discussion here (or even from the technical discussion in the Ap-
pendix), it is not easy to gain an intuitive understanding of what the model ‘looks
like’. To aid with such an intuitive understanding, Figure 3 shows a ‘landscape’
view of the model’s structure. Each pyramid represents a different hierarchically
organized firm. The size of each pyramid corresponds to the number of employ-
ees, height represents hierarchical level, and color represents relative income.
Figure 3 nicely highlights the main characteristics of the model. The firm
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power law distribution is clearly visible. The vast majority of firms are small, but
there are a few behemoths. Inter-firm income dispersion and inter-hierarchical
level income dispersion are also visible, while intra-hierarchical level income
dispersion appears negligible. Lastly, top incomes are concentrated in upper
hierarchical levels, and consequently occur mostly in larger firms. These facts,
which are qualitatively visible here, become even more clear as we analyze the
model results in quantitative terms.
2.2 Testing the Hierarchy Model (Part 1)
The purpose of the hierarchy model is to study the hierarchical structure of the
United States economy. The first step, then, is to make sure that the model
produces realistic results. To that end, Figure 4 compares the model’s aggre-
gate structure to US empirical data. Even though the model is an extrapolation
from a limited set of data, it does a reasonably accurate job of reproducing US
distribution of income.
A few things are obvious from this comparison. Firstly, the model under-
estimates US income inequality, both in terms of the Gini index (Fig. 4A) and
the income share of the top 1% (Fig. 4B). What is the source of this discrepancy?
Looking at the income probability density in Figure 4D, it appears that the US
income distribution is more ‘bottom heavy’ than the model. That is, the model
produces too few extremely small incomes, relative to the US. This tendency is
also evident in the cumulative distribution (Fig. 4F).
Why does this discrepancy occur? I demonstrate in Appendix F that the
discrepancy can be removed by increasing the model’s inter-firm income disper-
sion. This suggests that the model’s under-estimate of US inequality is due to
an under-estimate of inter-firm income dispersion. My guess is that this occurs
because the model is based on Compustat firm data, which is not a represen-
tative sample of the US firm population. Compustat contains data for public
firms only, and as a result, is biased towards large firms. I suspect that a more
representative firm sample would give greater inter-firm income dispersion.
I include adjusted results in the Appendix to show that the model is capable
of closely reproducing the important features of US income distribution (as any
well-parameterized model should be). I do not, however, use this adjusted data
for any of the proceeding analysis. The purpose of the model is to extrapolate
empirical data, warts and all.
While the model slightly misrepresents the ‘body’ of US income distribution,
it accurately reproduces the tail. This is evident in the complementary cumula-
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Figure 4: Modeled Income Distribution vs. US Data
This figure compares various aspects of the model’s income
distribution to US data over the years 1992-2015. Panel A
shows the Gini index, with two different US sources — the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). Panel B shows the top 1% income share, us-
ing data from 17 different time series. Panel C shows the
results of fitting a power law distribution to the top 1% of
incomes (where ↵ is the scaling exponent). Panel D plots
the income density curve with mean income normalized to
1 (using data from the CPS). Panels E, F, and G use IRS
data to construct the Lorenz curve, cumulative distribution,
and complementary cumulative distribution (respectively).
The cumulative distribution shows the proportion of indi-
viduals with income less than the given x value. The com-
plementary cumulative distribution shows the proportion
of individuals with income greater than the given x value.
Note the log scale on the x-axis for these last two plots. For
sources and methods, see Appendix A.
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tive distribution (Fig. 4F) in the form of virtually identical model and empirical
slopes in the right tail. How can these slopes be quantified? One way is to fit
the tail of the income distribution to a power law — a method that dates back
to the work of Pareto [1]. This approach provides a way of analyzing the tail of
the income distribution independently from the body.
Under a power law distribution, the probability of finding someone with in-
come x is proportional to x ↵, where ↵ is a constant (the power law exponent).
The approximate power law scaling of top incomes is visible as the straight line
in the tail of the complementary cumulative distribution (when plotted on a log-
log scale). The choice of where the distribution ‘tail’ begins is arbitrary. I define
the tail as the top 1% of incomes — a threshold that has been popularized by
Piketty [71]. Figure 4C shows the results of fitting a power law to the top 1%
of incomes (for methods, see Appendix A). The model produces power law ex-
ponents that are statistically indistinguishable from those found in the US data.
Both a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and a t-test indicate no significant differences
(at the 5% level) between the model and empirical results.
To conclude, the model produces an income distribution that is roughly con-
sistent with the US distribution of income. In particular the model closely re-
produces the tail of the US distribution.
2.3 Testing the Hierarchy Model (Part 2)
When discussing the model visualization shown in Figure 3, I noted that large
incomes appear to be clustered at the tops of large firms. This is a defining
feature of the hierarchy model. It occurs because income scales strongly with
hierarchical rank. As a result, top earners are found at the tops of large firms, be-
cause these firms have the most hierarchical levels. This prediction is not made
by any other model of income distribution (to my knowledge). It is important,
therefore, that we put it to the test.
To test this prediction, I look at the distribution of firm sizes associated with
top earning individuals. What does this mean? I take a sample of Americans
with top incomes, and then record the firms with which these individuals are
associated. I then look at the size distribution of these firms. I do the same with
the model, and compare the results.
I conduct this test using data from the Forbes 400 and Execucomp. The
Forbes 400 list is useful because it is a definitive ranking of the 400 richest Amer-
icans, and it provides the institutional source of each individual’s wealth. The
caveat is that this list is a ranking by wealth, not income. I use the Forbes 400 as
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a proxy for top US incomes, under the assumption that wealth and income are
strongly related. I supplement the Forbes 400 data with the ‘Execucomp 500’.
The latter is composed of the 500 top paid US executives (in each year between
1992-2015) in the Execucomp database. The advantage of the Execucomp 500
is that it is a ranking explicitly by income. The disadvantage is that we do not
know if these 500 executives are actually the top paid US individuals.
Before discussing the results of this test, it is instructive to know what a null-
effectwould look like. If there is absolutely no relation between income and firm
membership, what sort of firm size distribution should be associated with top
incomes? It turns out that for the United States, we should expect a null-effect
to return a roughly log-uniform distribution (see Appendix G for a derivation).
Results for the Fortune 400 and Execucomp 500 firm size distributions are
shown in the main panel of Figure 5. To be clear, these density plots represent
the size distribution of firms associated with the richest 400 Americans and the
500 top paid executives in the Execucomp database (respectively). To better
visualize the distribution, I plot the density of the logarithm of firm size. Under
this transformation, the null-effect result will appear as a uniform distribution.
From the evidence shown in Figure 5, we can immediately conclude that the
null-effect is false. There is definitely a relation between top incomes (wealth)
and firm size. But is it the relation that is predicted by the hierarchy model?
To find out, I conduct the same analysis on the model. I select the model’s
500 top paid individuals and record the size distribution of associated firms. The
results are shown in Figure 5 as the ‘Model 500’. The model predicts a relation
between top incomes and firm size that is very similar to the US empirical data.
To be sure, the model results are not identical to either the Forbes 400 or the
Execucomp 500 distributions. But, given the paucity of data on which the model
is based (as well as the general uncertainty in the empirical analysis of top in-
comes), I count this result as a success. The model produces results that are
roughly consistent with the US data.
Since the model has three sources of income dispersion, we naturally want to
know which of these sources is responsible for producing the results in Figure 5.
To answer this question, I use a counterfactual analysis. I create three different
counterfactual models to supplement the original (Model A). Each counterfac-
tual model isolates a single source of dispersion as it appears in the original
model. Model B has intra-hierarchical dispersion only, Model C has inter-firm
dispersion only, and Model D has intra-hierarchical level dispersion only.
The results of this counterfactual analysis are shown in the right-hand panels
in Figure 5. This analysis indicates that it is exclusively inter-hierarchical income
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Figure 5: Firm Size Distributions Associated With Top Incomes and Wealth
This figure shows the size distribution of firms associated with top earning individuals in
the US and in the hierarchy model (of the US). The ‘Forbes 400’ represents the size dis-
tribution of firms associated with (owned by) the wealthiest 400 Americans in the year
2014. The ‘Execucomp 500’ represents the size distribution of firms associated with the
500 top earning American executives (in each year from 1992-2015) in the Execucomp
database. The ‘Model 500’ represents the size distribution of firms associated with the
500 top earning individuals in the hierarchy model. Results for counterfactual models
are shown on the right. Each counterfactual model isolates a single source of income
dispersion. Model B shows inter-hierarchical dispersion only, Model C shows inter-firm
dispersion only, and Model D shows intra-hierarchical level dispersion only. In all plots,
I also show the log-uniform distribution (dotted line), which is predicted if there is no
relation between firm membership and income. For sources and methods, see Appendix
A.
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dispersion (Model B) that is responsible for associating top incomes with large
institutions. How do we know this? The inter-hierarchical dispersion model (B)
produces results that are virtually identical to the original model. At the same
time, inter-firm dispersion only (Model C) and intra-hierarchical level dispersion
only (Model D) produce drastically different results.
Note that with intra-hierarchical dispersion only (Model D), we recover the
null-effect (a log-uniform distribution). Why? In this model, firms play no part
in determining income. (Income for all individuals is determined by a single
stochastic function). Interestingly, this is a world that is implied by many models
of income that focus solely on interactions between individuals [2,3,5,6,10–13,
15, 16, 20]. In these models, there are no firms. The implicit assumption must
be that firms play no role in the distribution of income. Given the evidence in
Figure 5, it would seem that these models need rethinking.
To conclude, the hierarchy model correctly predicts that top paid individuals
should be associated with firms that are far larger than those of the general
population. Moreover, the model indicates that this effect is purely a result of
inter-hierarchical pay dispersion.
2.4 Quantifying Hierarchy’s Effect on Income Distribution
Having established that the hierarchy model gives credible results, I now use
it to investigate how hierarchy affects US income distribution. I isolate the ef-
fects of hierarchy by creating three different counterfactual version of the United
States. Each version contains only one of the three sources of income dispersion
used in the original model. By comparing these counterfactual models to the
original model, we can determine how each dispersion source affects income
distribution.
Let’s begin with a seemingly simple question: how does hierarchy affect in-
come inequality? The results in Figure 6 indicate that this question is not so
simple. The affect seems to depend on how we measure inequality. Let’s begin
by using the the Gini index (Figure 6A). Here we see that the model with inter-
firm dispersion has a Gini index that is closest to the original model. (The model
with inter-hierarchical dispersion comes a distant second). This result suggests
that hierarchy does not have a particularly strong effect on inequality.
However, things change drastically when we switch to measuring inequality
in terms of the income share of the top 1% (Fig. 6B). Now we find that the
model with inter-hierarchical dispersion has inequality that is nearly identical
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Figure 6: A Counterfactual Analysis of Model Properties
This figure compares the original hierarchy model of the United States to three differ-
ent counterfactual models. Each counterfactual model contains only one of the three
sources of income dispersion. Panel A compares the Gini index of each model, while
panel B compares the top 1% income share. Note that since both of these inequality
metrics are not additive, the inequality in the counterfactual models will not sum to the
inequality in the original model. Panel C shows power law exponents fitted to the top
1% of incomes in each distribution. Panel D shows the Lorenz curve for each model,
with shaded regions indicating the 95% range. Panel E shows the income density of each
model, plotted on a log-log scale. The shaded region indicates the top 1% of incomes.
For clarity (and because it plays a negligible role determining income distribution), the
intra-hierarchical dispersion model is not shown in panels D and E.
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to the original model. The other two sources of dispersion are inconsequential.
How can this be?2
To understand this apparent contradiction, let’s look at the Lorenz curves for
each model (Fig. 6D). The Lorenz curve offers a convenient way to visualize
the ‘shape’ of inequality. The curve traces the cumulative fraction of income
held by all individuals below a given income percentile. The Gini index and
the top 1% income share are both intimately related to the Lorenz curve. The
Gini index is proportional to the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of
perfect equality (the black line in Fig. 6D). The income share of the top 1% is
equal to the vertical distance between the Lorenz curve and y = 1 (at the point
x = 0.99).
The apparent contradiction between the Gini and top 1% results is now easy
to understand. It is caused by an intersection between the inter-firm Lorenz curve
and the inter-hierarchical level Lorenz curve. For incomes below this intersec-
tion, inter-firm dispersion plays the most important role in shaping inequality.
However, for incomes above the intersection, hierarchy plays the most impor-
tant role in shaping inequality. This nicely illustrates the pitfalls of quantifying
inequality with a single metric: it is never possible to capture all of the informa-
tion present in a Lorenz curve.
The counterfactual models indicate that inter-firm dispersion plays a very
different role in shaping income inequality than does inter-hierarchical disper-
sion. This is made even more clear by Figure 6E. Here I plot the income density
(in log-log form) of the original model. I then compare this to the density of the
inter-firm and inter-hierarchical counterfactual models. This allows us to see
how each factor contributes to the original model’s distribution of income. To
2 Some readers may note that I am using non-decomposable metrics to measure inequality.
Since neither the Gini index nor the top 1% income share are decomposable, the inequality of
the counterfactual models will not sum to the inequality of the original model. Thus we cannot
quantify exactly ‘how much’ each factor contributes to income inequality. Although there are
inequality metrics that are decomposable (such as the Theil index, or simply the variance), I
choose not to use them here. For starters, such measures are generally far less intuitive than the
Gini index or top income shares. Second, decomposable measures merely give a decomposition
of inequality — not the decomposition. Decomposition requires deciding how to weight the
number of incomes of a given size against the size of the income. Since there aremanyways to do
this, there are many equally valid decompositions of inequality. Anthony Shorrocks summarizes
the problem nicely: “Inequality comparisons are invariably sensitive to the choice of inequality
index used since alternative measures tend to emphasize inequality at different points in the
distribution. Replacing one index by another will therefore almost always change the relative
significance of the between- and with-group terms” [72].
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interpret this plot, look at how closely the distribution of a specific counterfac-
tual model comes to that of the original model. The closer it is, the more that
factor influences income at the point in question. The results are unambigu-
ous. A clear division exists between the body and tail of the distribution. The
body of the distribution is almost completely determined by inter-firm disper-
sion. However, the tail of the distribution is almost completely determined by
inter-hierarchical dispersion. (I do not include intra-hierarchical level dispersion
in this plot because it plays a negligible role in shaping income distribution).
Figure 6C further attests to the importance of hierarchy for determining the
tail of the distribution. This figure shows the fitted power law exponent for the
top 1% of incomes in each counterfactual model. The power law exponent gen-
erated by the inter-hierarchical model is virtually identical to the exponent gen-
erated by the original model. The other counterfactual models produce wildly
different results. This indicates that it is solely inter-hierarchical dispersion that
is responsible for generating top incomes. (For a discussion of how hierarchical
class structure works to create the power law tail, see Appendix H.)
To be clear, fitting a power law to a distribution does not indicate that the
underlying distribution is actually a power law. We know a priori that neither
inter-firm nor intra-hierarchy models actually produce power law tails, since dis-
persion within these models is generated with gamma and lognormal distribu-
tions, respectively (see Appendix E). In this case, the fitted power law exponent
is purely descriptive. It allows us to quantify the heaviness of the distribution
tail, independently from the body of the distribution. A heavier tail is indi-
cated by a smaller power law exponent. The large exponents for inter-firm and
intra-hierarchy models indicate that these distributions have tails that are far
less heavy than the inter-hierarchical model.
To summarize, I have used the hierarchy model to gain insight into how
hierarchy affects the US distribution of income. I find that hierarchy plays a
decisive role in shaping the tail of the distribution of income. In contrast, the
body of the distribution appears to be mostly determined by differences in pay
between firms. This suggests that hierarchical class structure is primarily useful
for understanding top incomes.
3 A Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis
Having established that the hierarchy model gives decent results, I now put it
to a bold use. As I stated in the introduction, I believe that hierarchy shapes
our social world in enumerable ways. As such, I want to know if hierarchy can
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be used as a mechanism for unifying income distribution theory. I devote the
remainder of the paper to this question. In this section, I investigate if hierarchy
can be used to connect personal and functional income distribution.
3.1 Capitalists and the 1%
Long before the Occupy movement decried the separation between “the 1% and
the rest of us” [73], the labor movement decried the separation between capital-
ists and the rest of us (workers). Are the two types of class division connected?
I think so. And I think that hierarchy lies at the root of this connection. The hi-
erarchy model suggests that top earners are hierarchical elites. I think the same
is true of capitalists.
But for this hypothesis to make any sense, we must radically shift our ideas
about what ‘capital’ is, and what it means to be a ‘capitalist’. Building on Nitzan
and Bichler’s capital as power hypothesis [49], I propose that capitalist income
is derived from power — hierarchical power. By owning firms, capitalists earn
the legal right to helm firm hierarchies. From this position of power, capitalists
can partition firm income streams as they see fit [74]. This hierarchical power,
I suggest, is the source of capitalist income.
But a hierarchy does not have a single position of power. Rather, there is
a gradient of power from top to bottom. Perhaps, along with this gradient of
power, there is a gradient of ownership and a gradient of capitalist income? I
call this the ‘capitalist gradient’ hypothesis. The idea is that the proportion of in-
come individuals earn from capitalist sources tends to increase with hierarchical
power. In other words, we can predict (in statistical terms) someone’s capitalist
income fraction simply by knowing their position with a firm hierarchy.
This is a bold and very much exploratory idea, but one worth testing. Sur-
prisingly (from a mainstream perspective), I find that the capitalist gradient hy-
pothesis has empirical support. Evidence suggests that the capitalist income
fraction of US CEOs scales with hierarchical power (as I measure it). Using the
hierarchy model, I generalize this CEO relation to test if it applies to the general
US population. The model suggests that it does. This capitalist gradient model
reproduces the US distribution of capitalist income as well as the scaling relation
between income size and capitalist income fraction.
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3.2 The Source of Capitalist Income
To begin our investigation of capitalist income, let’s start with what all political
economists can agree on. Capitalist income stems from owning capital. Beyond
this trivial statement, opinions diverge rapidly. The sticking point is capital itself.
True, capitalists earn income from capital — but what is capital?
Let’s begin with the neoclassical vision of capital. In neoclassical theory,
capital is a ‘factor of production’. Capital consists of all the tools, technology,
and infrastructure that are used to produce economic output.3 Capitalists earn
income because their capital is productive — it contributes to economic output
[75,76]. This thinking is illustrated in Figure 7.
Marxists start with a similar physical understanding of capital. According to
Marx, capital is the ‘means of production’ — the tools, technology, and infras-
tructure that are used by society to create economic output [39]. The Marxist
twist is to assert that capitalist income is parasitic. Marxists believe that labor is
the source of all value. Because capitalists own the means of production, they
are able to extract a surplus from labor. This thinking is illustrated in Figure 8.
Both neoclassical and Marxist theories of capital keep their eyes firmly on the
‘real’ sphere of production — on the ownership of things. The ‘capital as power’
approach, proposed by Nitzan and Bichler, is quite different. This approach fo-
cuses on ownership as an institutional act. What is the difference? Focusing on
the act of ownership (and not what is owned) puts the focus on power. Nitzan
and Bichler summarize: “ownership is wholly and only an institution of exclu-
sion, and institutional exclusion is a matter of organized power” [49]. According
to the capital as power hypothesis, capital is not a thing, but an act. It is a com-
modification of property rights — a vendible form of power.
In the context of studying hierarchy, the capital as power approach is useful
because it puts the focus on the ownership of institutions (not things). Consider
what it means to purchase all the shares in a company. What is it that you are
buying? You are essentially purchasing legal control over the company. From
this position of power, you have legal authority to divide up the firm’s income
stream as you see fit. You could slash wages and pay yourself a magnificent
profit, or raise wages and earn no profit at all. From this perspective, capitalist
income stems from one’s power as owner.
3 Admittedly, neoclassical economists have significantly broadened their definition of ‘capital’
over the years. For instance, there is now ‘human capital’ [65–67], ‘knowledge capital’ [77,78],
and even ‘cultural capital’ [79]. However, what has not changed is the insistence that ‘capital’
(in all its forms) is productive.
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Figure 7: The Neoclassical Vision of Capitalist Income
In neoclassical theory, capitalists earns income because their capital is inherently produc-
tive. Capitalists earn the ‘marginal product’ of their capital — the incremental increase
in output per incremental increase in capital input.
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Output
Figure 8: The Marxist Vision of Capitalist Income
In Marxist theory, capitalists earn income because they own ‘means of production’. Un-
like neoclassical theory, Marxists see labor as the source of all value, and capitalists as
parasites. Because capitalists control the means of production (capital), they are able
to extract a surplus from labor.
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For the present argument regarding the basis of capitalist income, I set aside
the question of how the firm’s income stream is derived. Instead, I am inter-
ested in how an owner wields power to partition a firm’s income stream. The
central hypothesis in this paper is that firms are hierarchically organized. This
hypothesis implies that ownership confers the right to sit at the top of the firm
hierarchy. From this position of hierarchical power (as owner), the capitalist has
the authority to divide up the firm’s income stream. This suggests that capitalist
income stems from hierarchical power. This vision is illustrated in Figure 9.
While this vision is intuitive (at least to me), it is almost certainly too sim-
plistic. The problem is that it is based on a 19th century, all-or-nothing concept
of ownership. In this vision, a capitalist is the owner of a firm. Unfortunately,
the rise of joint-stock companies muddies this tidy theory. Joint-stock companies
allow ownership to by divided among many people. In the modern world, par-
tial ownership is the rule. This realization led to the famous ‘separation thesis’
posited by Berle and Means [80]. The idea is that ownership has become so dif-
fuse that capitalists no longer control the corporate hierarchy. Instead, control
is ceded to managers, who are employees.
The problem with the separation thesis is that it acknowledges the rise of
partial ownership, but insists on a traditional dichotomy between capitalists and
laborers. The truth is that the line between being a capitalist and being a laborer
has been blurred. Top managers often earn a large portion of their income from
stock options. Conversely, owners of firms often pay themselves some form of
salary. Instead of a capitalist-laborer dichotomy, what we need is a capitalist-
laborer gradient. This implies that there is a steady range between being purely
a capitalist and being purely a laborer. Figure 10 shows what this might look
like when applied to a hierarchy. As one moves up the hierarchy, individuals
become increasingly more capitalistic.
This capitalist gradient hypothesis can be interpreted a number of ways. The
simplest interpretation is to assume a gradient of ownership within a single firm.
However, this is realistic only for firms that are 100% employee owned. While
such firms do exist (and can become quite large), they are not the norm. It is
more common for a firm to have partial employee ownership via an employee
stock ownership plan. In 2017, about 14 million Americans were enrolled in
employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) [81]. This represents about 9% of the
workforce. It is quite plausible that these employee stock options are preferen-
tially rewarded to the top tiers of the hierarchy. However, ESOP assets constitute
a small minority (roughly 4%) of total US market capitalization.4 This means
A Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis 26
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Figure 9: A Hierarchical Power Vision of Capitalist Income
This figure shows my interpretation of the capital as power framework, when applied
to a hierarchically organized firm. Unlike in neoclassical and Marxist visions of capital
(Fig. 7 and 8, respectively) I do not show physical capital. This is not to say that physical
capital does not exist — we simply do not focus on it. Rather, we focus on ownership
of institutions. Capital is conceived solely in terms of property rights. By purchasing a
firm, a capitalist purchases the legal right to sit at the top of the firm hierarchy. From
this position of power, the capitalist has the right to divide up the firm’s income stream
as he sees fit. Under this vision, hierarchical power is the source of capitalist income.
Capitalist
Laborer
Figure 10: A Gradient Vision of Capitalist Income
This figure shows a more nuanced (than Fig. 9) interpretation of the relation between
capitalist income and firm hierarchy. In this model, there is a smooth gradient between
being 100% capitalist (earning all your income from capitalist sources) and being 100%
laborer (earning all your income from labor sources). I hypothesize that the capitalist
share of individual income tends to increase with hierarchical power.
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they are probably not the main source of capitalist income.
Therefore, it is most realistic to interpret the gradient model as a statistical
phenomenon that occurs at the societal level. We admit that the ownership struc-
ture of any given firm is likely complex. Similarly, we admit that individuals who
earn capitalist income may receive it from a variety of firms. But at the aggregate
level, we hypothesize that earning capitalist income is related hierarchical class
structure. This is the hypothesis that I test.
3.3 Measuring Hierarchical Power
To test the capitalist gradient hypothesis, we need tomeasure hierarchical power.
What is hierarchical power? I define it as the ability to control subordinates
within a hierarchical chain of command. Unlike the more general concept of
‘social power’, hierarchical power is easier to pin down and quantify. This is
because the chain of command structure of a hierarchy clearly delineates who
has control over whom. A hierarchy is nothing but a nested set of power relations
between superior and subordinates (ruler and ruled). It is a control structure that
concentrates power at the top [48].
I propose that one’s power within a social hierarchy is proportional to the
number of subordinates under one’s control. I put this in formula form as:
hierarchical power= number of subordinates+ 1 (1)
The logic of this equation is that all individuals start at a baseline power of 1,
indicating that they have control over themselves. Power then increases linearly
with the number of subordinates.
Figure 11: Measuring Hierarchical Power
4 In 2017, ESOPs had total assets of roughly $1.3 trillion [81], while total US market capi-
talization was roughly $30 trillion, according to the Russel 3000 index.
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As an example, suppose we want to find the hierarchical power of the red
individual in Figure 11. This person has two direct subordinates, each of whom
have 2 subordinates. Thus the red individual has control over 6 subordinates
in total, mean his/her hierarchical power is 7. The general form of a branching
hierarchy means that hierarchical power increases exponentially with rank.
3.4 Testing the Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis (Part 1)
If the capitalist gradient hypothesis is correct, we should be able to find evi-
dence that capitalist income fraction increases with hierarchical power. I test
the gradient hypothesis using CEO income data. This data is convenient for two
reasons. First, CEO income data is easy to obtain. US regulation requires that
public companies disclose CEO compensation. Second, we can estimate a CEO’s
hierarchical power without any knowledge of the firm’s hierarchical structure.
Under the assumption that the CEO holds the top hierarchical position in a firm,
it follows that their hierarchal power is equivalent to the number of employees in
the firm.
This thinking is visualized in Figure 12. If a firm has x employees, x   1 of
them will be subordinate to the CEO. Since hierarchal power is defined as the
number of subordinates plus one, the CEO’s hierarchical power is simply firm
size x . Thus, if we have data for firm size, we automatically have data for CEO
hierarchical power.
So how do we calculate the ‘capitalist’ component of CEO income? I define
the CEO capitalist income fraction as the portion of total income received from
stock options:
CEO Capitalist Income Fraction=
Income from Stock Options
Total Compensation
(2)
Unlike cash compensation, there are many different ways to value stock options
[82–84]. This means that CEO capitalist income fraction has some inherent
ambiguity. However, the nuances of stock option valuation do not concern me
here. Instead, I am interested in general trends in CEO compensation. For this
task, the standard methods for stock option valuation will do just fine. I use CEO
income data from the Execucomp database. The data series and their underlying
methods are discussed in Appendix C.
Figure 13 shows the resulting relation between capitalist income fraction and
firm size for roughly 40,000 American CEOs over the years 1992-2015. Two
important findings emerge. Firstly, the capitalist fraction of CEO income tends
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Figure 12: CEO Hierarchical Power
This figure shows the relation between firm size and CEO hierarchical power. Each
hierarchy represents a different firm, with the CEO at the top (red). If hierarchical
power is defined as the number of subordinates + 1 (Eq. 1), CEOs have hierarchical
power equal to firm size.
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Figure 13: Capitalist Income Fraction of US CEOs
This figure plots the relation between capitalist income fraction and firm size for roughly
40,000 American CEOs over the years 1992-2015. Assuming that CEOs sit at the top of
the corporate hierarchy, firm size is a direct indicator of CEO hierarchical power. The
median (P50) and interquartile range (P25-P50) for capitalist income fraction are cal-
culated using logarithmically spaced firm-size bins. The dashed line indicates the linear
regression used for modeling purposes. Data comes from Execucomp and Compustat.
For methods, see Appendix C.
A Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis 30
to increase with firm size (and hence hierarchical power). Secondly, capitalist
income fraction tends towards zero for CEOs in very small firms (fewer than 10
employees). These results are consistent with the capitalist gradient hypothesis
— they support the idea that earning capitalist income is a gradient function of
hierarchical power.
3.5 Testing the Capitalist Gradient Hypothesis (Part 2)
The evidence from US CEOs begs a question: does the relation between CEO
capitalist income fraction and hierarchical power generalize to the broader US
population? While data constraints stop us from answering this question di-
rectly (which is why we turned to CEO data in the first place), we can answer it
indirectly by using the hierarchy model.
I do this by using the CEO data to create a simple function relating capitalist
income fraction to hierarchical power. Once I have this function, I plug it into
the hierarchy model and endow each individual with a capitalist income. I then
check the model’s results against US data. If the model produces results that
are way off the mark, we know that the CEO results do not generalize to the
whole population. However, if the model produces results that are consistent
with US data, this is indirect evidence that capitalist income fraction increases
with hierarchical power in the wider US population.
The first step is to idealize the Figure 13 trend between CEO capitalist in-
come fraction and hierarchical power. The simplest interpretation of this trend
is that CEO income fraction increases linearly with the logarithm of hierarchical
power. I fit the CEO data with a one-parameter logarithmic function, resulting in
the ‘Modeled Trend’ line shown in Figure 13. This gives the following function
relating capitalist income fraction (Kfrac) to hierarchical power (P):5
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) (3)
This function is naive in the sense that it implies a deterministic relation
between hierarchical power and capitalist income fraction — something that
certainly does not exist in the real world. However, models are always sim-
plifications, and it is often useful to simplify a noisy (stochastic) trend with a
5 The discerning reader may note that, since a logarithmic function is uniformly increasing,
Eq. 3 permits capitalist income fraction greater than 1. In practice, such results do not occur
because the model does not permit firm sizes greater than 2.3 million — the largest US firm that
has ever existed (Walmart, circa 2015). For this maximum hierarchical power of 2.3 million, Eq.
3 yields a capitalist income fraction of about 0.7.
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Figure 14: A Landscape View of the Capitalist Gradient Model
This figure visualizes the capitalist gradient model as a landscape of firms. Each pyramid
represents a firm, with size indicating the number of employees. Hierarchical rank is
indicated by height, and capitalist income fraction by color.
deterministic one. If the results are good, we can add more realism later. If the
results are bad we throw away the model.
The next step is to plug this equation into the hierarchy model. We calculate
the hierarchical power of each individual in the model (see Appendix D) and
then use Eq. 3 to calculate the capitalist fraction of their income. The result-
ing capitalist gradient model is visualized in landscape form in Figure 14. As
expected, capitalist income fraction is tightly related to hierarchical rank.
If the CEO capitalist income trend is generalizable, the capitalist gradient
model should produces results that match US data. So does it? Figure 15 com-
pares the model to the United States. Let’s begin with the relation between
capitalist income and total income size. This is effectively the relation between
personal and functional income distribution — something that I have proposed
that hierarchy can unify. Figure 15A plots Thomas Piketty’s data showing how
US capitalist income fraction increases with income percentile [71]. As illus-
trated by the inset plot (which uses a linear x-axis scale), there is an explosion
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Figure 15: Comparing the Capitalist Gradient Model to US Data
This figure compares the income distribution generated by the capitalist gradient model
to US data. Panel A shows how capitalist income fraction increases with income per-
centile (ranked by total income). The inset plot uses a linear x-axis scale, while the
main plot uses an inverted logarithmic scale of top incomes. Note that US empirical
data has ‘steps’ that correspond to the bins in the source data. The blue line and shaded
regions indicate the model’s median and 95% range, respectively. For panels B, C and D,
US capitalist income is defined as the sum of income from dividends and interest. Data
covers the years 1990 - 2014. Panel B shows the size distribution of capitalist income.
The model data is normalized to have mean income in the same range as the US data.
Panel C shows the inequality of capitalist income, as measured by the Gini index, while
Panel D shows capitalist income inequality as measured by the income share of the top
1%. Panel E shows the capitalist share of total (national) income. For comparison, I
also show the dividend and net interest share of US income. For sources and methods,
see Appendix A.
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of capitalist income that occurs in the topmost income percentiles. Evidently,
those who earn very large incomes are overwhelmingly capitalists (and vice
versa). The main panel spreads out this explosion by using an inverted log-
arithmic x-axis scale. Two different US trend-lines are shown. The upper line
includes capital gains in the calculation of capitalist income, while the lower line
does not. (The step-wise nature of these curves reflects Piketty’s income bins.)
Like the US data, the capitalist gradient model predicts an explosion in capitalist
income amongst top earners.
Moving on, Figure 15B shows the size distribution of US capitalist income.
For this graph (as well as Fig. 15C, D and E ), I define capitalist income as
the sum of income from dividends and interest. Although many people do earn
some capitalist income, the amount is usually inconsequentially small. This fact
is reflected in the inset panel, which plots the capitalist income distribution on
a linear scale. Nearly all reported capitalist incomes are lower than $5000. In
order to see the tail of the distribution, the main plot uses a log-log scale. Again,
the model is consistent with US data. To get these results, I do nothing but index
the model data so it has the same mean as US data. Without tuning it to do so,
the model effectively reproduces the tail of US capitalist income distribution.
How about capitalist income inequality? Figure 15C and D show the Gini
index and top 1% share of capitalist income, respectively. Just to be clear, the
latter metric captures the share of total capitalist income held by the top 1%
of reported capitalist incomes. First off, note how unequal US capitalist income
is. The Gini index hovers around 0.9 (the maximum is 1), while the top 1% of
capitalists earn about 40% of total capitalist income. The model reproduces this
staggering income share of the top 1%, but falls short with the Gini index. Why?
Part of the problem can be seen in Figure 15B — the model produces slightly
too many capitalist incomes between $2000 to $5000.
However, the primary problem has to do with the function used to determine
capitalist income (Eq. 3). Capitalist income is assumed to increase linearly with
the logarithm of hierarchical power. Since log(1) = 0, all individuals with a hier-
archical power of 1 (the lowest amount possible) will have exactly zero capitalist
income. When calculating inequality, these null incomes are (by convention) ex-
cluded. If we adjust the model slightly so that instead of having no income, these
individuals have a tiny capitalist income, we get Gini index results that match
US data. See Appendix F for more details of this adjustment.
Lastly, Figure 15E shows the capitalist share of total (national) income. The
model produces a capitalist income share that is slightly lower (but in a similar
range) as the US data (from 1992-2014). For future reference, I also include the
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individual components of US capitalist income. (In section 4, I model historic
trends in the dividend share of national income).
To summarize, the capitalist gradient model produces results that closely
match US empirical data. This is indirect evidence suggesting that capitalist
income fraction scales with hierarchical power in the general US population.
3.6 Property, Power, and Income
The results shown in Figure 13 and 15 are preliminary, and should be treated
with appropriate uncertainty. That being said, I want to reflect on their poten-
tial significance. In effect, the capitalist gradient model connects three things.
It suggests that hierarchical class structure, ownership class structure, and per-
sonal income distribution are all related. Put another way, hierarchical elites,
capitalists, and top earners are all the same people.
What are we to make of this hypothesized relation between authority, prop-
erty rights, and income? One interpretation is that it is nothing new. Suppose,
when speaking about a feudal society, I stated that hierarchical elites, aristocrats,
and the very rich are all the same people. This would be nothing particularly
controversial. We are quite comfortable concluding that historical societies had
a ruling class [85]. But many would bristle at that thought in our own society.
Yet consider the Reinhard Bendix’s description of the relation between authority,
property rights, and income in German feudal society. He writes:
governmental functions were usable rights which could be sold or leased at
will. For example, judicial authority was a type of property. The person who
bought or leased that property was entitled to adjudicate disputes and receive
the fees and penalties incident to such adjudication. [86] (p. 149)
If we paraphrase Bendix, we arrive at the same reasoning that I used to derive
the capitalist gradient hypothesis. Building on the work of Nitzan and Bichler,
I suggested that ‘capitalist authority’ is a ‘type of property’. The person who
buys this property is ‘entitled’ to wield hierarchical power and ‘receive income’
in return. From this reasoning came the hypothesis that capitalist income should
be related to hierarchical rank and power.
From the perspective of mainstream economic theory, this hypothesis is quite
radical. It undermines the ubiquitous assumption that capitalists earn income
from a productive asset. But given Bendix’s comments on feudal society, the
capitalist gradient hypothesis may be quite conservative. Why? Conservatism
implies a lack of change—amaintenance of the same order. The capitalist gradi-
ent hypothesis may be conservative because it suggests that income distribution
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in modern capitalist societies might not be as different from past feudal societies
as we would like to think.
4 A Hierarchical Redistribution Hypothesis
I turn now frommodeling the static distribution of income, to modeling inequal-
ity dynamics. Over the last three decades, there has been an explosion in inequal-
ity in the United States (with less pronounced increases in other countries). I set
aside the difficult ‘why’ question, and instead focus on the ‘how’ question. How
did this increase occur? Does it have any relation to firm hierarchy? I think
that it does. There is good evidence suggesting that the US has undergone a
hierarchical redistribution of income — a transfer of income from the bottom to
the top of firm hierarchies. I call this the ‘hierarchical redistribution’ hypothesis,
and I test it using the hierarchy model.
4.1 The Evidence
Let’s look at some evidence that hints at hierarchical redistribution. One trend
that slaps us in the face is the post-1980 explosion in the CEO pay ratio. As
shown in Figure 16A, this explosion corresponds closely with increases in the top
1% income share (Fig. 16B). Assuming that CEOs sit at the top of the corporate
hierarchy, the increasing CEO pay ratio suggests that hierarchical redistribution
has occurred.6
Figure 16D gives more evidence hinting at hierarchical redistribution. Here
I show trends in the power law exponent of the top 1% of US incomes. This ex-
ponent quantifies the ‘fatness’ of the distribution tail (a smaller exponent means
a fatter tail). This analysis demonstrates that rising top income inequality is as-
sociated with a fattening of the tail of the income distribution. What does this
have to do with hierarchy? According to our model, hierarchy plays a dominant
role in shaping the tail of US income distribution (section 2). Therefore, it is
plausible that a fattening tail might be caused by hierarchical redistribution.
The connection between CEO pay and income inequality has been widely
discussed [90–94], as has the fattening of the income distribution tail [8, 16,
95]. Less recognized, however, is the relation between rising inequality and the
6 Mishel and Davis [87] note a strong correlation between CEO compensation and stock
market returns. This raises the possibility of connecting income redistribution to capital accu-
mulation, something that has been theorized by Bichler and Nitzan [88]. However, such an
investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 16: Historical Income Distribution
Trends in the United States
This figure shows four trends in US income distribu-
tion that hint at hierarchical redistribution. Panel A
shows the trend in the CEO pay ratio [89]. This ra-
tio is calculated using CEO income in the 350 largest
US firms (ranked by sales), compared to the average
income of workers in the firm’s respective industry.
Panel B shows the trend in US inequality, as mea-
sured by the top 1% income share. The shaded re-
gion indicates the range of 17 different estimates for
the top 1% income share. The line represents the
median of these estimates. Panel C shows the trend
in the dividend share of national income. Panel D
shows the fitted power law exponent for the top 1%
of incomes. The grey region indicates the range of
estimates (when different series are available). The
line indicates the median estimate. For sources and
methods see Appendix A.
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redistribution of functional income. As shown in Figure 16C, changes in the
US dividend share of national income are strongly correlated with changes in
the top 1% income share. The correlation coefficient ranges between 0.82 and
0.90, depending on the choice of data. Is this trend also related to hierarchical
redistribution? The capitalist gradient model suggests that it might be.
The capitalist gradient model proposes that individuals becomemore capital-
istic as hierarchical rank increases (section 3). This model implies that a bottom-
to-top redistribution of pay within firm hierarchies should correspond with an
increase in the capitalist share of total income. Why? Top-ranked individuals
are hypothesized to have a greater proportion of capitalist income relative to
bottom-ranked individuals (regardless of the relative size of top and bottom in-
comes). If top-ranked individuals increase their share of the pie, the capitalist
share of total income should increase as well.
To summarize, the trends in Figure 16 suggest a hierarchical redistribution
of income within firms. To test this hypothesis, I use the hierarchy model.
4.2 Methods
The idea behind my test of the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis is quite
simple. If the trends in Figure 16 are caused by a hierarchical redistribution
of income, we ought to be able to replicate them with the hierarchy model. I
attempt this replication by varying the rate at which modeled pay increases with
hierarchical rank. I call the parameter that controls this rate the ‘hierarchical
pay-scaling parameter’. See Appendix E for a technical discussion about what
this parameter does.
Varying the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter changes the returns to hier-
archical rank, and by extension, the returns to hierarchical power. This effect
is illustrated in Figure 17. When the pay-scaling parameter is small (indicated
by the color red), relative pay increases very slowly with hierarchical rank and
power. But when the pay-scaling parameter is large (indicated by blue), there
is an extremely rapid increase in pay with hierarchical rank and power.
To test the hierarchical redistribution hypothesis using the hierarchy model, I
restrict the scope of analysis to the years 1965 onward. I do this for two reasons.
Firstly, the CEO pay ratio data begins in 1965. Secondly, the model assumes an
unchanging firm size distribution. From the late 1960s onward this assumption
is valid — the US firm size distribution changed very little. However, prior to the
1960s the US firm size distribution changed rapidly [69], violating the model’s
assumptions.
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Figure 17: Changing How Income Scales with Hierarchical Rank and Power
This figure shows the results of the hierarchy model when the hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter is allowed to vary (over different model iterations). Panel A shows howmean
pay (relative to the bottom hierarchical level) increases by hierarchical rank. Different
pay-scaling parameters are indicated by color. Panel B shows the same effect, but with
hierarchical power (where hierarchical power is defined as the number of subordinates
+ 1). Individuals are grouped into log-spaced bins by hierarchical power. Note that
the trends in both panels become increasingly noisy for the very top hierarchical ranks
and very large hierarchical power. This is because individuals with very high rank are
extremely rare, so the mean encompasses relatively few individuals. In both plots, hor-
izontal ‘jitter’ is added to increase the visibility of all data points.
In this test, I vary only the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter. Inter-firm
dispersion and intra-hierarchical level dispersion remain at the levels implied by
modern case study and Compustat data. I continue to use the capitalist gradient
model to decompose income into capitalist and labor components. Importantly,
I do not vary the function that determines capitalist income fraction (Eq. 3).
To model the data in Figure 16, I add two assumptions to the hierarchy
model. The first assumption is used to model the dividend share of national
income. The capitalist gradient model predicts total capitalist income only, and
does not differentiate between interest and dividends. To model the dividend
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share of income, I assume that dividends constitute exactly half of capitalist
income. This 50-50 split between interest and dividends is what the US has av-
eraged over the last century (see Fig. 15E for the post-1990 split). Although
there have been important historical variations in the composition of capitalist
income [49], these are not included in the model.
The second assumption has to do with modeling the CEO pay ratio. The
empirical CEO pay ratio in Figure 16 is calculated using CEO pay in the top
350 US firms, ranked by sales. The average pay of employees is calculated using
average pay in each firm’s respective sector [89]. Themodel has neither sales, nor
sectors, nor explicit job titles. I assume that CEOs are the top-ranked individual
in each firm hierarchy. I calculate the model’s CEO pay ratio using CEO income
in the top 350 firms, ranked by total payroll. I use payroll as a proxy for sales,
since the two metrics are highly correlated (see Appendix C). Because the model
has no sectors, I use the average pay in the whole model to calculate average
worker pay.
4.3 Results
Results of the hierarchical redistribution model are shown in Figure 18. Because
the model has no time element, I compare only the relation between trends.
(Note that the top 1% share is the common x-axis in all panels). Each panel
shows both US empirical and model relations. As in Figure 17, variation in the
hierarchical pay-scaling parameter is indicated by color. The take-homemessage
here is that, by varying hierarchical pay, the hierarchy model is able to reproduce
the general form of the empirical trends identified in Figure 16.
To be sure, the model’s results are not perfect. In general, the model tends
to underestimate the top 1% income share. This causes a leftward shift in the
modeled relations (relative to the empirical ones). The hierarchy model is heav-
ily dependent on the Compustat database, which is biased towards large firms.
I have hypothesized that this bias causes the model to underestimate inter-firm
income dispersion. In Appendix F, I show that increasing inter-firm dispersion
(so that the model almost perfectly reproduces the US distribution of income)
improves the accuracy of the hierarchical redistribution model.
Another problem is that the model’s dividends versus top 1% slope is not
quite correct. This slope turns out to be heavily dependent on the particular
functional relation between hierarchical power and capitalist income fraction.
While the function that I use is based on empirical data (see section 3), there is
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Figure 18: The Hierarchical Redistribution Model vs. US Data
This figure compares model results to historical trends in US income distribution. Model
results are produced by varying the hierarchical pay-scaling parameter, indicated by
color. Each colored point represents a single model iteration. US empirical data is shown
in black, with horizontal error lines indicating the range of 17 different estimates for the
top 1% income share. The point indicates the median of these estimates. Panel A plots
the CEO pay ratio against the top 1% share, while panel B plots the dividend share of
national income against the top 1% share. Panel C plots the fitted power law exponent
of the top 1% of incomes against the top 1% income share. For sources and methods,
see Appendix A.
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tremendous uncertainty in this relation. More empirical research is needed to
understand the source of this model discrepancy.
4.4 Discussion
While we should always be cautious about drawing conclusions from a model,
I want to offer my thoughts on the significance of these results. There has been
a tendency, in political economy, to explain human income distribution in terms
of ‘natural law’. For instance, John Bates Clark began his foundational text on
marginal productivity by declaring: “It is the purpose of this work to show that
the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a natural law” [75]. This
tendency was only strengthened when Pareto discovered the ubiquitous power
law scaling of top incomes [1].
But what is curious about ‘natural law’ theories is that they are almost always
atomistic. Thus, Clark showed that perfectly competitive markets distribute in-
come according to ‘natural law’. But leviathan governments are mysteriously ab-
sent from this picture. In a sense, the term ‘natural law’ is used as a euphemism
for ‘in the absence of concentrated power’. Thus, ‘natural law’ explanations of
skewed income distribution tails are typically based on atomistic premises, in
which there are isolated individuals but no institutions [5, 18]. From this per-
spective, power is a distortion.
But what if concentrated power is the reason that income distribution has
a power law tail? This is the story told by the hierarchy model. This model
suggests that hierarchy — a form of concentrated power — is responsible for
producing the fat tail of US income distribution. The same model suggests that
changes in the tail are a result of a hierarchical redistribution of pay. Thus, hier-
archy provides a potentially potent tool for understanding both the regularities
of income distribution over time and space, but also the variation. I propose that
the regularity of power-law income distribution tails owes to the ubiquity of so-
cial hierarchy. Conversely, I propose that variation in the tail owes to hierarchical
redistribution.
I conclude by visualizing the hierarchical redistribution that has occurred
in the United States (as suggested by the hierarchy model). Figure 19 shows
two modeled versions of the United States. On top is the 1965 version. On
the bottom is the 2015 version. The difference between the two is subtle — it
is almost completely isolated to the tops of large firms. Here we see a massive,
order of magnitude increase in relative pay— a clear redistribution of income to
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Figure 19: A Visualization of US Hierarchical Income Redistribution
This figure shows the model’s representation of historical hierarchical income redistri-
bution in the United States. The top model represents the US in 1965 while the bottom
represent the US in 2015. I create these models by choosing the hierarchical pay-scaling
parameter that best matches the US CEO pay ratio, top 1% and dividend share data in
the year in question. The difference between the twomodel’s is mostly visible at the tops
of large firms as an order of magnitude increase in the pay of top-ranked individuals.
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top-ranked individuals. If the model is correct, we can conclude that the US has
undergone a massive hierarchical redistribution of income in the last 30 years.
5 Conclusions: Modeling from the Top Down
Many economists have an understandable desire to model human society from
from the ‘bottom up’ [7]. This means that they seek to explain complex so-
cial structures solely in terms of the interaction of individuals. The bottom up
strategy is a noble one, in principle. It would be a triumph of science if we
could explain macro-level income distribution based purely on the interactions
of individuals. In the same way, it would be a triumph of science if we could
understand the emergence of consciousness based purely on the interactions of
atoms and molecules. This is a noble pursuit in principle. In practice, however,
it is misguided.
The problem is two-fold. The first problem is computational feasibility. Sup-
pose we had a highly accurate model of the human psyche, comparable to the
accuracy of quantum mechanics. If we did, it’s highly likely that meaningful
questions would be computationally unfeasible. Even though it is the general
scientific consensus that consciousness emerges from matter alone (i.e. there is
no mind-body dualism) I know of no attempt to simulate consciousness using
the laws of physics. The problem is simply too difficult. Quantum physics is so
computationally complex that it is difficult to simulate large molecules, let alone
brains.
The second problem is that to build a model from the bottom up, we need
a highly accurate model of the ‘fundamental particles’. We have a pretty good
model of atoms. Do we have a good model of the human psyche? Hardly. I
believe we should be humble and admit that we know very little about human
behavior. As a consequence, when we model from the bottom up, we are essen-
tially groping in the dark. We must make blind assumptions about how agents
behave. The problem is that the entirety of the modeling effort depends on these
assumptions. The model may very well give good results — it may seem to ‘ex-
plain’ the social phenomena in question. But if the underlying assumptions are
incorrect, the entire model is wrong.
The dream of explaining income distribution from the bottom up is a noble
one. The problem is that we are hopelessly far from being able to do this the right
way. The bottom up models that do exist make extremely naive assumptions
about how humans behave. While these models give good results, it is a fallacy
to think that this validates their underlying assumptions.
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The alternative to the bottom-up approach is to model from the top down.
What does this mean? Instead of having social structure emerge from the bottom-
up actions of individuals, we (the modelers) impose structure from the top down.
In essence, we impose structure on society and then explore the consequences.
The origin of this structure is left unexplored. The top-down approach is useful
because it allows realism and ignorance to coexist. A realistic model of income
distribution must have institutions — they are simply too important to ignore.
But we know very little about how and why institutions form. The top-down
approach allows us to model institutions without having any idea of why they
exist.
This is the philosophy that underlies the hierarchymodel. Themodel is based
on two observations of the real-world: (1) firms are the dominant institution
for organizing paid human activity (in capitalist societies); and (2) firms are
hierarchically organized. The model takes these facts as given, and explores
their consequences.
The central finding of the hierarchy model is that hierarchy shapes the tail
of the income distribution. According to our model, it is hierarchy that causes
the distinctive power-law scaling of top incomes. This is important because ex-
plaining the power-law distribution of top incomes has been one of the primary
concerns of income distributionmodelers. The over-whelmingmajority of power
law generating models are based on atomistic premises. As far as I am aware,
the hierarchy model is the only power law generating model that includes insti-
tutions.
But this is not all. The hierarchy model is, to my knowledge, the only power
law generating model that is completely empirically grounded. As I have stated
many times, the hierarchy model amounts to an extrapolation of real-world evi-
dence. The model takes the little information of firm hierarchy that does exist,
and extrapolates it to create a large-scale simulation of the US economy. To risk
overstating this, there is nothing in the model that is not implied by empirical
data.
The story that the hierarchy model tells is this: the power-law distribution
of top incomes arises from concentrations of power. The model suggests that
without large, hierarchically organized firms, there would be no power law dis-
tribution of top incomes. This finding is significant in its own right, but made
more so by its stark contrast with mainstream, neoclassical economic theory.
James T. Peach summarizes the neoclassical approach: “Individual productivity
and exogenously determined shifts in supply and/or demand curves determine
distributive shares. ... [T]here is no power and there is no income distribution
Conclusions: Modeling from the Top Down 45
0
250
500
750
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Income Percentile
Av
e. 
Hi
era
rch
ica
l P
ow
er Linear Scale
1
10
100
1000
10 000
100 000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Income Percentile
Av
era
ge
 H
ier
arc
hic
al 
Po
we
r
Figure 20: The Rich and Powerful — Hierarchical Power and Top Incomes
This figure plots average hierarchical power (number of subordinates + 1) against in-
come percentile for individuals in the hierarchy model of the United States. The shaded
regions indicates the 95% range, while the line indicates the median. In order to show
the entire range of data, the main panel uses a logarithmic scale on the y-axis. The inset
panel uses a linear y-axis to illustrate how rapidly hierarchical power increases in the
top 1% of incomes.
problem” [57]. If the hierarchy model is correct, concentrated power is not an
aberration — it is the norm. Based on the model results, I have suggested that
power-law scaling of top incomes is ubiquitous because concentrated power (in
the form of hierarchical institutions) is also ubiquitous.
To put matters simply, the hierarchy model gives new meaning to the phrase
‘rich and powerful’. This is made clear by Figure 20. Here I plot average hier-
archical power against income percentile for the hierarchy model of the United
States. Two completely different populations emerge — those with power and
those without. The vast majority of people have very little hierarchical power.
But things change drastically for the small minority in the upper income per-
centiles. Here there is an explosion of hierarchical power. This power, I believe,
is the origin of the great inequalities that plague human society (now and in
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the past). Hierarchical power gives preferential access to resources, plain and
simple.
That being said, there is no fixed relation between income and hierarchical
power. Gerhard Lenski [55] gives the curious example of Robert McNamara’s
move from the Ford Motor Company to the position of US Secretary of Defense.
McNamara’s new position had far more power, and yet his income did not in-
crease. Instead, it decreased by an order of magnitude. Why? These are ques-
tions we must ask. Unlike Clark’s theory of marginal productivity, a theory of
income distribution based on hierarchy and power has no ‘laws’. Things can and
do change.
To conclude, the hierarchy model is a first attempt at quantitatively studying
the distributional consequences of hierarchical organization. If nothing else, the
model suggest that hierarchy must be taken seriously — it is a grave mistake to
‘assume’ hierarchy away when building income distribution models. If we want
to alleviate income inequality, we need to understand it. This understanding
will undoubtedly require models, but these models must be rooted in the real
world — a world in which concentrated power appears to be the norm.
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Appendices
Supplementary materials for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work repository:
https://osf.io/3bsvt/
The supplementary materials include:
1. Data for all figures appearing in the paper;
2. Raw source data;
3. R code for all analysis;
4. Hierarchy model code.
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A Sources and Methods
Fig. 4: Modeled Income Distribution vs. US Data
Complementary Cumulative Distribution
The US complementary cumulative distribution is calculated from data in the IRS
Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.1, from 1996 to 2015.
Cumulative Distribution
The US cumulative distribution is calculated from data in the IRS Individual
Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.1, from 1996 to 2015.
Gini Index
I use two sources for the US Gini index. The first source is the US Current Popu-
lation Survey, Table PINC-08 (available from the US Census) over the years 1994
to 2015. The second source is the IRS Individual Complete Report (Publication
1304), Table 1.1, from 1996 to 2015. I estimate the Gini index by constructing a
Lorenz curve from the reported cumulative frequency data. R code implement-
ing this method is available in the Supplementary Material.
The Census and IRS data are not mutually consistent. IRS data is based
on tax units, not individuals. The advantage of the IRS data is that it is an
administrative record. Current Population Survey (CPS) data, on the other hand,
is obtained by interview. The advantage of the CPS data is that it explicitly counts
individuals. The disadvantage is that “there is a tendency in household surveys
for respondents to under report their income” [96].
Lorenz Curve
The US Lorenz curve is calculated from data in the IRS Individual Complete Report
(Publication 1304), Table 1.1, from 1996 to 2015.
Power Law Exponents
I estimate the power law exponent of the income distribution tail using the max-
imum likelihood method. US empirical data comes from the IRS Individual
Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 1.1. Since this data is reported in
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Table 1: Power Law Cutoff Boundaries in US Data
Year Percentile ↵
1996 0.987 2.92
1997 0.985 2.89
1998 0.996 2.58
1999 0.996 2.58
2000 0.995 2.54
2001 0.996 2.63
2002 0.996 2.67
2003 0.996 2.65
2004 0.995 2.59
2005 0.994 2.54
2006 0.993 2.54
2007 0.993 2.54
2008 0.994 2.66
2009 0.995 2.78
2010 0.994 2.73
2011 0.994 2.74
2012 0.992 2.64
2013 0.993 2.74
2014 0.992 2.70
2015 0.991 2.72
binned form, I use the binned log-likelihood equation developed by Virkar and
Clauset [97]:
L = n(↵  1) · ln bmin +
kX
i=min
hi ln
î
bi
(1 ↵)   bi+1(1 ↵)
ó
(4)
Here ↵ is the power law exponent, bi and bi+1 are consecutive bin bound-
aries, hi and hi+1 are consecutive bin counts, k is the number of bins, and n
is the sum of bin counts above bmin (the cutoff point for the power law). The
best-fit exponent ↵ is the value that maximizes the log-likelihood function (L ).
Since there is no closed-form solution to this maximization problem, I solve for
↵ numerically. To determine the power law exponent for the top 1% of incomes
in each year, I set the power law cutoff boundary (bmin) to the empirical bin that
is closest to the 99th percentile. Results are shown in Table 1.
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To find the power law exponent in modeled data, I use the following maxi-
mum likelihood estimator:
↵ˆ= 1+ n
ñ
nX
i
ln
xi
xmin
ô 1
(5)
Here ↵ˆ is the best-fit power law exponent, xi is the ith data point, xmin is the
lower bound of the power law, and n is the number of data points above xmin. To
ensure compatibility with empirical power law estimates, I estimate the model’s
power law exponent using the empirical cutoff values. For each model run, I set
xmin by randomly selecting a percentile value from Table 1.
All data and code are available in the Supplementary Material.
Probability Density Function
I estimate the normalized probability density function for US income using data
from Current Population Survey Table PINC-08 (available from the US Census)
over the years 1994 to 2015. This table reports binned data.
To estimate the normalized probability density function in each year, I first
create a simulated income distribution (I) using bin midpoints. Each midpoint
income Mi is repeated Fi times, where Fi is the frequency count for the ith bin.
I then normalize I by dividing all elements by the mean income I¯ .
I=
Ä
M1
⇥F1· · · · · ·, M2 ⇥F2· · · · · ·, ... , Mi ⇥Fi· · · · · ·
ä
I¯
(6)
Lastly, I fit the simulated income distribution (I) with a numerical density func-
tion. R code implementing this method is available in the Supplementary Mate-
rial.
Top 1% Income Share
Sources for top 1% income share data are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: US Top 1% Income Share Sources
Series Info Source
sfainc992j Pre-tax factor income | equal-split adults | Share | Adults | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfainc996i Pre-tax factor income | individuals | Share | 20 to 64 | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfainc999i Pre-tax factor income | individuals | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfainc999t Pre-tax factor income | tax unit | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc992j Fiscal income | equal-split adults | Share | Adults | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc992t Fiscal income | tax unit | Share | Adults | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc996i Fiscal income | individuals | Share | 20 to 64 | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc999i Fiscal income | individuals | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc999t Fiscal income | tax unit | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sptinc992j Pre-tax national income | equal-split adults | Share | Adults | share of total (ratio) [98]
sptinc996i Pre-tax national income | individuals | Share | 20 to 64 | share of total (ratio) [98]
sptinc999i Pre-tax national income | individuals | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sptinc999t Pre-tax national income | tax unit | Share | All Ages | share of total (ratio) [98]
sfiinc_z_US World Top Incomes Legacy Series [99]
lakner Calculated from micro data [100]
piketty_book_no_kgains Legacy data from Capital in the 21st Century [71]
piketty_book_with_kgains Legacy data from Capital in the 21st Century [71]
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Fig. 5: Firm Size Distributions Associated With Top Incomes and
Wealth
Forbes 400 data is from the year 2014. Firm size data was collected by the
author. For public companies, firm size data comes from Compustat. For private
companies, data comes from firm websites and annual reports. The Execucomp
500 consists of the 500 top paid US executives in the Execucomp database in
each year from 1992 to 2015.
Fig. 13 Capitalist Income Fraction of US CEOs
CEO pay data comes from Execucomp, while firm size data comes from Com-
pustat. For the methods used to identify firm CEOs and the methods used to
calculate capitalist income fraction, see Appendix C.
Fig. 15: Comparing the Capitalist Gradient Model to US Data
Capitalist Income Fraction vs. Income Percentile
US data is for the year 2007 and comes from Piketty, Fig. 8.10 [71]. Data is
available at piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2.
Capitalist Income Gini Index, Top 1% Share, and Size Distribution
Data for US capitalist income Gini index, top 1% share, and size distribution all
come from the IPUMS database. I define capitalist income as the sum of income
from dividends and interest. (Dividends = series INCDIVID, Interest = series
INCINT).
Themain challengewith this dataset is that it censors income above $100,000.
All incomes above this threshold are replacedwith a ‘topcode’ value. To deal with
this censoring, I use the method proposed by Jenkins et al. [101]. The gist of
this method is that you fit the uncensored data with a parametric distribution.
You then replace the censored (topcoded) data with stochastic values drawn
from the fitted parametric distribution (above the censor threshold). This gives
a partially synthetic dataset on which you compute whatever statistic you de-
sire. Because the process is stochastic, you repeat it many times, giving a range
of values for the given statistic.
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Figure 21: US Capitalist Income Inequality Estimates
This figure shows estimates of inequality in US capitalist income distribution. Data
comes from the IPUMS database CPS public micro data. Capitalist income is the sum of
dividends (series INCDIVID) and interest (series INCINT). Confidence intervals indicate
the uncertainty in the estimate that arises from the stochastic method used to replace
topcoded values.
I follow Jenkins et al. by using the GB2 distribution (generalized beta distri-
bution of the second kind) to fit uncensored data. I use the R GB2 package [102]
to fit both the dividends and interest data with a GB2 distribution. After replac-
ing topcoded values with synthetic data, I sum dividends and interest income to
estimate capitalist income. Figure 21 show the resulting estimates for the Gini
index and top 1% share of capitalist income. Although there is uncertainty in
each annual estimate, the actual range of inequality values is dominated by the
secular trend.
All code and data used for this analysis are provided in the Supplementary
Material.
Capitalist Share of Total (National) Income
US Capitalist income share data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Table 1.12. (National Income by Type of Income). Capitalist income is defined
as the sum of net dividends and net interest.
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Fig. 16: Historical Income Distribution Trends in the United States
CEO pay ratio data comes from Mishel and Schieder [89]. This ratio is calcu-
lated using CEO income in the 350 largest US firms (ranked by sales), compared
to the average income of workers in the firm’s respective industry. Top 1% in-
come share data sources are shown in Table 2. The dividend share of national
income is calculated using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table
1.12. (National Income by Type of Income).
Power law exponents for the top 1% of incomes are estimated on binned data
using the method outlined by Virkar and Clauset [97]. I use income threshold
data from the World Wealth and Income Database (see Table 3)
Table 3: US Top 1% Power Law Exponent Data Sources
Series Info Source
tfainc992j Pre-tax factor income | equal-split adults | Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local currency [98]
tfiinc992j Fiscal income | equal-split adults | Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local currency [98]
tfiinc992t Fiscal income | tax unit | Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local currency [98]
tptinc992j Pre-tax national income | equal-split adults | Threshold | Adults | constant 2015 local currency [98]
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B Hierarchical Structure and Pay within Case-Study Firms
Based on worldly experience, most people would agree that firms are hierarchi-
cally organized, and that pay tends to increase as one moves up the hierarchy.
However, the exact structure of this hierarchy has not been widely studied. This
is likely due in part to the lack of scholarly interest (hierarchy is not part of neo-
classical economic theory), but also the difficulty of obtaining firm payroll data,
which is usually proprietary. Nonetheless, a handful of case-studies exist that
have documented the hierarchical employment and pay structure of firms.
Table 4 summarizes the case studies used in this paper, while Figure 22 shows
the hierarchical employment and pay structure of these firms. The firms remain
anonymous, and are named after the authors of the case-study papers. By and
large, these studies confirm our basic intuition about firm structure. Although
the exact shapes vary, all of the firms in Figure 22 have a roughly pyramidal
employment structure and inverse pyramid pay structure.
To analyze the structure of these firms in further detail, I define and calculate
the following three metrics: the span of control, the inter-level mean pay ratio,
and the intra-level Gini index. The span of control is defined as the employment
ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels. The inter-level mean pay ratio is the
ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical levels. Lastly, the intra-level
Gini index is the Gini index of income inequality within a specific hierarchical
level of a firm.
Table 4: Summary of Firm Case Studies
Source Years Country Firm Levels
Span of
Control
Level
Income
Level Income
Dispersion
Audas [103] 1992 Britain All
Baker [104] 1969-1985 United States Management
Dohmen [105] 1987-1996 Netherlands All
Grund [106] 1995 & 1998 US and Germany All
Lima [107] 1991-1995 Portugal All
Morais [108] 2007-2010 Undisclosed All
Treble [109] 1989-1994 Britain All
Notes: This table shows metadata for the firm case studies displayed in Fig. 23. ‘Firm Levels’ refers to the portion of the
firm that is included in the study. ‘Management’ indicates that only management levels were studied.
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Figure 23 shows data for these metrics for the 6 case study firms. Figure
23A shows how the span of control changes as a function of hierarchical level.
The data shows unambiguously that the span of control tends to increase as one
moves up the hierarchy. Figure 23B shows how the inter-level pay ratio changes
as a function of hierarchical level. Again, this ratio tends to increase as onemoves
up the hierarchy. Figure 23C shows the intra-level Gini index as a function of hi-
erarchical level. Unlike the other two quantities, intra-level income inequality
seems to be more-or-less constant across all hierarchical levels (a linear regres-
sion reveals no significant trend).
This case study data plays a central role in the hierarchical model developed
in this paper. From the case study evidence, I propose the following ‘stylized’
facts about firm employment and pay structure:
1. The span of control tends to increase with hierarchical level.
2. The inter-level pay ratio tends to increase with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-level income inequality is approximately constant across all hierar-
chical levels.
The case-study evidence informs the basic structure of the model, and also
some of its key parameters. Parameters for span of control are determined from
regressions on data in Figure 23A, while parameters for intra-level income dis-
persion are determined from the mean of data in Figure 23C. For a detailed
discussion of the model algorithm and parameter fitting procedure, see Sections
D and E.
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Figure 22: The Hierarchical Employment and Pay Structure of Six Different
Firms
This figure shows the pyramid structure of six different case study firms. Panel A shows
the hierarchical structure of employment, while panel B shows the hierarchical pay
structure.
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Figure 23: Case Studies of Firm Hierarchical Structure
This figure shows data from 7 different single-firm case studies. Panel A shows how the
span of control (the employment ratio between adjacent levels) relates to hierarchical
level. Panel B shows how the ratio of mean pay between adjacent levels varies with
hierarchical level. In these two panels, the x-axis corresponds to the upper hierarchical
level in the ratio. Panel C shows levels of income inequality within individual hierar-
chical levels of each firm. Note that horizontal ‘jitter’ has been introduced in all three
plots in order to better visualize the data (hierarchical level is a discrete variable). Grey
regions correspond to the 95% confidence interval for regressions (or in panel C, the
mean).
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C Compustat Data
This paper makes extensive use of the Compustat and Execucomp databases.
Compustat contains data for most publicly traded US companies, while Exe-
cucomp contains data for executive compensation. Three key statistics used
throughout this paper are calculated from this data: firm mean income, the CEO-
to-average-employee pay ratio, and the capitalist income fraction of executives. I
discuss the data and methods used for these calculations in the following sec-
tions.
C.1 Firm Mean Income
Firm mean income is calculated by dividing total staff expenses (Compustat Se-
ries XLR) by total employment (Compustat Series EMP):
Firm Mean Income=
Total Staff Expenses
Total Employment
(7)
C.2 CEO Pay Ratio
Throughout this paper, I use the term ‘CEO’ to refer to the executive at the top of
the corporate hierarchy. I identify CEOs using the titles contained in the Execu-
comp series TITLEANN. Because titles vary greatly by company, identifying the
top executive is not always a simple task. While a manual search would be most
accurate, this is unrealistic given that the Execucomp database contains over
275 000 entries. Instead, I use the following three-step algorithm to identify the
‘CEO’:
1. Find all executives whose title contains one or more of the words in the
‘CEO Titles’ list (Table 5).
2. Of these executives, take the subset whose title does not contain any of
the words in the ‘Subordinate Titles’ list (Table 5).
3. If this search returns more than one executive per firm per year, chose
the executive with the highest pay.
After identifying the CEO (and matching CEO pay data with firm data con-
tained in the Compustat database), I calculate the CEO pay ratio using the fol-
lowing equation:
CEO Pay Ratio=
CEO Pay
Firm Mean Income
(8)
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Table 5: Titles Used to Identify the ‘CEO’
CEO Titles: Subordinate Titles
president vp
chairman v-p
CEO cfo
Chief Executive Officer vice
chmn chief finance officer
president of
coo
division
div
president-
group president
chairmain-
co-president
deputy chairman
pres.-
Chief Financial Officer
Notes: This table shows the Execucomp titles used to identify the CEO of each
company. CEOs are deemed to be those whose title contains words in the left
column, but not those in the right column. Titles such as ‘president-’ and ‘pres-
ident of’ are included in the subordinate list because they typically refer to a
president of a division with the company: i.e. ‘president of western division’ or
‘president-western hemisphere’.
CEO pay ratio and firmmean income data are collectively available for roughly
6000 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2016. I use this data to ‘tune’
my hierarchical model of the firm (see Section E) . Figure 24 shows selected
summary statistics of this dataset.
C.3 Capitalist Income Share of Executives
I define the capitalist income share of executives (Kfrac) as the ratio of stock-
options income to total income:
Kfrac =
Stock Options
Total Income
(9)
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Figure 24: Selected Statistics from the Firm Sample Used for Model Tuning
This figure shows statistics for the Compustat firm sample used to tune my hierarchical
model. Panel A shows the number of firms in the sample over time, Panel B the average
firm size, and Panel C the share of US employment held by these firms. Panel D shows
the logarithmic distribution of firm size, and Panel E shows the logarithmic distribution
of the CEO pay ratio. Panel F shows the mean CEO pay ratio of all firms over time. Panel
G shows the logarithmic distribution of normalized mean pay (mean pay divided by the
average pay of the firm sample in each year). Panel H shows the ratio of mean pay in
the Compustat sample relative to the US average (calculated from BEA Table 1.12 by
dividing the sum of employee and proprietor income by the number of workers in BEA
Table 6.8C-D. Panel I shows the Gini index of firm mean pay over time.
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Table 6: Data Used to Calculate Executive Capitalist Income Fraction
Series Description
Reporting
Format
RSTKGRNT
The value of restricted stock granted during the year
(determined as of the date of the grant).
1992
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE
The aggregate value of stock options granted to the
executive during the year as valued using Standard &
Poor’s Black-Scholes methodology.
1992
TDC1
Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted
Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted
(using BlackScholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and
All Other
1992
STOCK_AWARDS_FV
Fair value of all stock awards during the year as detailed
in the Plan Based Awards table. Valuation is based upon
the grant-date fair value as detailed in FAS 123R.
2006
OPTION_AWARDS_FV
Fair value of all options awarded during the year as
detailed in the Plan Based Awards table. Valuation is
based upon the grant-date fair value as detailed in FAS
123R.
2006
TDC1
Salary, Bonus, Non-Equity Incentive Plan
Compensation, Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards,
Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards, Deferred
Compensation Earnings Reported as Compensation,
and Other Compensation.
2006
The Execucomp database contains two main accounting methods for valu-
ing stock options: a ‘1992’ reporting format that applies from 1992 to 2005’,
and a ‘2006’ reporting format that applies from 2006 onward. These series are
summarized in Table 6. For both reporting formats, the relevant total income
series (TDC1) remains the same. I calculate the capitalist income fraction of
executives using the following two formulas for 1992 format and 2006 format,
respectively:
Kfrac_1992 =
RSTKGRNT+OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE
TDC1
(10)
Kfrac_2006 =
STOCK_AWARDS_FV+OPTION_AWARDS_FV
TDC1
(11)
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Figure 25: Firm Sales vs. Payroll in the Compustat US Database
This figure plots normalized firm sales against normalized firm payroll for every firm-
year observation in the Compustat US database from 1950 to 2015. Each dot is a specific
firm in a specific year. To adjust for inflation, I divide sales and payroll by the database
averages in the respective year.
C.4 Firm Sales vs. Firm Payroll
In section 4, I use the hierarchy model to reproduce historical trends in the CEO
pay ratio. The empirical data from Mishel and Schieder [89] uses the CEOs
in the top 350 US firms ranked by sales. Since the hierarchy model does not
have sales, I calculate the CEO pay ratio by ranking firms by total payroll. Since
payroll is highly correlated with firm sales (Fig. 25), the former is a good proxy
for the latter.
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D Hierarchy Model Equations
In this section, I outline the mathematics underlying my hierarchical model of
the firm. The model assumptions, outlined below, are based on the stylized facts
gleaned from the real-world firm data in section B.
1. Firms are hierarchically structured, with a span of control that increases
exponentially with hierarchical level.
2. The ratio of mean pay between adjacent hierarchical levels increases ex-
ponentially with hierarchical level.
3. Intra-hierarchical-level income is lognormally distributed and constant across
all levels.
Using these assumptions, I first develop an algorithm that describes the hi-
erarchical employment within a model firm, followed by an algorithm that de-
scribes the hierarchical pay structure.
Table 7: Notation
Symbol Definition
a span of control parameter 1
b span of control parameter 2
C CEO to average employee pay ratio
E employment
F cumulative distribution function
G Gini index of inequality
h hierarchical level
I¯ average income
µ lognormal location parameter
n number of hierarchical levels in a firm
p pay ratio between adjacent hierarchical levels
r pay-scaling parameter
s span of control
  lognormal scale parameter
T total for firm
# round down to nearest integerQ
product of a sequence of numbersP
sum of a sequence of numbers
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D.1 Generating the Employment Hierarchy
To generate the hierarchical structure of a firm, we begin by defining the span
of control (s) as the ratio of employment (E) between two consecutive hierar-
chical levels (h), where h = 1 is the bottom hierarchical level. It simplifies later
calculations if we define the span of control in level 1 as s = 1. This leads to the
following piecewise function:
sh ⌘
8<: 1 if h= 1Eh
Eh 1
if h  2 (12)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the span of
control is not constant; rather it increases exponentially with hierarchical level.
I model the span of control as a function of hierarchical level (sh) with a simple
exponential function, where a and b are free parameters:
sh =
(
1 if h= 1
a · ebh if h  2 (13)
As one moves up the hierarchy, employment in each consecutive level (Eh)
decreases by 1/sh. This yields Eq. 14, a recursive method for calculating Eh.
Since we want employment to be whole numbers, we round down to the nearest
integer (notated by #). By repeatedly substituting Eq. 14 into itself, we can
obtain a non-recursive formula (Eq. 15). In product notation, Eq. 15 can be
written as Eq. 16.
Eh =# Eh 1sh for h> 1 (14)
Eh =# E1 · 1s2 ·
1
s3
· ... · 1
sh
(15)
Eh =# E1
hY
i=1
1
si
(16)
Total employment in the whole firm (ET ) is the sum of employment in all
hierarchical levels. Defining n as the total number of hierarchical levels, we get
Eq. 17, which in summation notation, becomes Eq. 18.
ET = E1 + E2 + ...+ En (17)
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ET =
nX
h=1
Eh (18)
In practice, n is not known beforehand, so we define it using Eq. 16. We
progressively increase h until we reach a level of zero employment. The highest
level nwill be the hierarchical level directly below the first hierarchical level with
zero employment:
n= {h | Eh   1 and Eh+1 = 0} (19)
To summarize, the hierarchical employment structure of our model firm is
determined by 3 free parameters: the span of control parameters a and b, and
base-level employment E1. Code for this hierarchy generation algorithm can be
found in the C++ header files hierarchy.h and exponents.h, located in the
Supplementary Material.
D.2 Generating Hierarchical Pay
To model the hierarchical pay structure of a firm, we begin by defining the inter-
hierarchical pay-ratio (ph) as the ratio of mean income ( I¯) between adjacent
hierarchical levels. Again, it is helpful to use a piecewise function so that we
can define a pay-ratio for hierarchical level 1:
ph ⌘
8<: 1 if h= 1I¯h
I¯h 1
if h  2 (20)
Based on our empirical findings in Section B, we assume that the pay ratio
increases exponentially with hierarchical level. I model this relation with the
following function, where r is a free parameter:
ph =
(
1 if h= 1
rh if h  2 (21)
Using the same logic as with employment (shown above), the mean income
Ih in any hierarchical level is defined recursively by Eq. 22 and non-recursively
by Eq. 23.
I¯h =
I¯h 1
ph
(22)
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I¯h = I¯1
hY
i=1
pi (23)
To summarize, the hierarchical pay structure of our model firm is determined
by 2 free parameters: the pay-scaling parameter r, and mean pay in the base
level ( I¯1). Code for generating hierarchical pay can be found in the C++ header
files model.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
D.2.1 Useful Statistics
Two statistics are used repeatedly within the model: mean firm pay, and the
CEO-to-average-employee pay ratio.
Mean income for all employees ( I¯T) is equal to the average of hierarchical
level mean incomes ( I¯h) weighted by the respective hierarchical level employ-
ment (Eh):
I¯T =
nX
h=1
I¯h · EhET (24)
To calculate the CEO pay ratio, we define the CEO as the person(s) in the
top hierarchical level. Therefore, CEO pay is simply I¯n, average income in the
top hierarchical level. The CEO pay ratio (C) is then equal to CEO pay divided
by average pay:
C =
I¯n
I¯T
(25)
D.3 Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion
Up to this point, we havemodeled only themean incomewithin each hierarchical
level of a firm. The last step in the modeling process is to add pay dispersion
within each hierarchical level.
I assume that pay dispersion within hierarchical levels is lognormally dis-
tributed. The lognormal distribution is defined by location parameter µ and
scale parameter  . Our empirical investigation of firm case studies indicated
that pay dispersion with hierarchical levels is relatively constant (see Fig. 23C).
Given this finding, I assume identical inequality within all hierarchical levels.
This means that the lognormal scale parameter   is the same for all hierarchical
levels.
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Figure 26: Adding Intra-Level Pay Dispersion to a Model Firm
This illustrates a model firm with lognormal pay dispersion in each hierarchical level.
The model firm has a pay-scaling parameter of r = 1.2 and an intra-level Gini index
of 0.13. Panel A shows the separate distributions for each level, with mean income
indicated by a dashed vertical line. Panel B shows contribution of each hierarchical
level to the resulting income distribution for the whole firm (income density functions
are summed while weighting for their respective employment).
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In order to add dispersion within each hierarchical level, I multiply mean pay
I¯h by a lognormal random variate with an expected mean of one. Formally, this
is represented by Eq. 26. Since the mean of a lognormal distribution is equal to
eµ+
1
2 
2
, I leave it to the reader to show that a mean of one requires that µ be
defined by Eq. 27.
Ih = I¯h · lnN (µ, ) (26)
µ=  1
2
 2 (27)
Given a value for   (which is a free parameter), we can define the pay distri-
bution within any hierarchical level of a firm. This process is shown graphically
in Figure 26. Figure 26A shows the lognormal income distributions for each hier-
archical level of a 5-level firm. Figure 26B shows the size-adjusted contribution
of each hierarchical level to the overall intra-firm income distribution. Lower
levels have more members, and thus dominate the overall distribution. The
code implementing this method can be found in the C++ header file model.h,
located in the Supplementary Material.
D.4 Calculating Hierarchical Power
I define an individual’s hierarchical power as the number of subordinates (S)
under their control, plus 1:
P = S + 1 (28)
Because the hierarchy model simulates only the aggregate structure of firms
(employment by hierarchical level), hierarchical power is calculated as an av-
erage per rank. For hierarchical rank h, the average hierarchical power (P¯h) is
defined as the average number of subordinates (S¯h) plus 1:
P¯h = S¯h + 1 (29)
Each individual with rank h is assigned the average power P¯h. The average
number of subordinates S¯h is equal to the sum of employment (E) in all subor-
dinate levels, divided by employment in the level in question:
S¯h =
h 1X
i=1
Ei
Eh
(30)
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Figure 27: Calculating the Average Number of Subordinates
As an example, consider the hierarchy in Figure 27. The average number of
subordinates below each individual in hierarchal level 3 (red) would be:
S¯3 =
E1 + E2
E3
=
16+ 8
4
= 6 (31)
Therefore, these individuals would all be assigned a hierarchical power of 7.
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Table 8: Model Parameters
Parameter Definition Action Scope
↵
Firm size distribution
exponent
Determines the skewness of the firm
size distribution
—
a, b Span of control parameters
Determines the shape of the firm
hierarchy.
Identical for all firms.
E1
Employment in base
hierarchical level
Used to build the employment
hierarchy from the bottom up.
Determines total employment.
Specific to each firm.
r Pay-scaling parameter
Determines the rate at which mean
income (within a firm) increases by
hierarchical level.
Specific to each firm.
I¯h
Mean pay in base hierarchical
level
Sets the base level income of the
firm, which determines firm average
pay.
Specific to each firm.
 
Intra-hierarchical level pay
dispersion parameter
Determines the level of inequality
within hierarchical levels of a firm.
Identical for all firms.
E Restricting Parameters
As discussed in section D, the hierarchy model has many ‘free’ parameters. Table
8 summarizes all of the parameters used in this model. While free to take on
any value, I restrict these parameters exclusively using empirical data. In the
following sections, I outline the methods used for this restriction.
E.1 Firm Size Distribution
Recent studies have found that firm size distributions in the United States [68]
and other G7 countries [70] can be modeled accurately with a power law. A
power law has the simple form shown in Eq. 32, where the probability of obser-
vation x is inversely proportional to x raised to some exponent ↵:
p(x)/ 1
x↵
(32)
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Figure 28: The United States Firm Size Distribution
This figure shows the US firm size distribution compared to a power law distribution
with exponent ↵ = 2.01 (a simulation with 15 million firms) . The US histogram
combines data for ‘employer’ firms with data for unincorporated self-employed
workers. Data for ‘employer’ firms is from the US Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S.
Businesses (using data for 2013). This data is augmented with Bureau of Labor
Statistics data for unincorporated self-employed workers (series LNU02032185 and
LNU02032192). The histogram preserves Census firm-size bins, with self-employed
data added to the first bin. The last point on the histogram consists of all firms with
more than 10,000 employees.
Figure 28 compares the US firm size distribution with a power law of ex-
ponent ↵ = 2.01. Although not perfect, the fit is good enough for modeling
purposes. I assume that the firm sizes can be modeled with a discrete power
law random variate. I model the US firm size distribution with ↵= 2.01.
A characteristic property of power law distributions is that as ↵ approaches
2, the mean becomes undefined. In the present context, this means that the
model can produce firm sizes that are extremely large — far beyond anything
that exists in the real world. To deal with this difficulty, I truncate the power
law distribution at a maximum firm size of 2.3 million. This happens to be the
present size of Walmart, the largest US firm in existence.
Code for the discrete power law random number generator can be found in
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Figure 29: Density Estimates for Span of Control Parameters
This figure shows density estimates for the parameters a and b, which together deter-
mine the ‘shape’ of the firm hierarchy. These parameters are determined from regres-
sions on firm case-study data (Fig. 23). The density functions are estimated using a
bootstrap analysis, which involves resampling (with replacement) the case study data
many times, and calculating the parameters a and b for each resample.
the C++ header file rpld.h, located in the Supplementary Material. This code
is an adaption of Collin Gillespie’s discrete power law generator found in the R
poweRlaw package [110] (which is, in turn, an adaption of the algorithm outline
by Clauset [111]).
E.2 Span of Control Parameters
The parameters a and b together determine the shape of firm employment hier-
archy. These parameters are estimated from an exponential regression on case
study data (Fig. 23A). The model proceeds on the assumption that these param-
eters are constant across all firms.
Because the case-study sample size is small, there is considerable uncertainty
in these values. I incorporate this uncertainty into the model using the bootstrap
method [112], which involves repeatedly resampling the case-study data (with
replacement) and then estimating the parameters a and b from this resample.
Figure 29 shows the probability density distribution resulting from this bootstrap
analysis. I run the model many times, each time with a and b determined by a
bootstrap resample of case-study data.
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Code implementing this bootstrap can be found in the C++ header file
boot_span.h.
E.3 Base Level Employment
Given span of control parameters a and b, each firm hierarchy is constructed
from the bottom hierarchical level up. Thus, we must know base level employ-
ment. In practice, however, we don’t know this value — instead we are given
total employment for a particular firm. While it may be possible to use the
equations in section D to define an analytic function relating total employment
to base level employment, this is beyond my mathematical abilities.
Instead, I use the model to reverse engineer the problem. I input a range
of different base employment values into equations 13, 16, and 18 and calcu-
late total employment for each value. The result is a discrete mapping relating
base-level employment to total employment. I then use the C++ Armadillo in-
terpolation function to linearly interpolate between these discrete values. This
allows us to predict base level E1, given total employment ET . Code implement-
ing this method can be found in the C++ header file base_fit.h, located in the
Supplementary Material.
E.4 Pay-Scaling Parameter
The pay-scaling ratio r determines the rate at which mean pay increases by hier-
archical level. Unlike the span of control parameters, the pay-scaling parameter
is allowed to vary between firms. But how should it vary? I restrict the variation
of this parameter in a two-step process. I first ‘tune’ the model to Compustat
data. This results in a distribution of pay-scaling parameters specific to Com-
pustat firms. I then fit this data with a parameterized distribution, from which
simulation parameters are randomly chosen.
E.4.1 Fitting Compustat Pay-Scaling Parameters
I fit the pay-scaling parameter r to Compustat firms using the CEO-to-average-
employee pay ratio (C). The first step of this process is to build the employment
hierarchy for each Compustat firm using parameters a, b, and E1 (the latter is
determined from total employment). Given this hierarchical employment struc-
ture, the CEO pay ratio in the modeled firm is uniquely determined by the pa-
rameter r. Thus, we simply choose r such that the model produces a CEO pay
ratio that is equivalent to the empirical ratio.
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Figure 30: Fitting Compustat Firms with a Pay-Scaling Parameter
This figure shows the fitted pay-scaling parameters (r) for all Compustat firms. Panel A
shows the relation between the CEO pay ratio and firm size, with the fitted pay-scaling
parameter indicated by color. The discrete changes in color (evident as vertical lines)
correspond to changes in the number of hierarchical levels within firms. The pay-scaling
parameter distribution for all firms (and years) is shown in panel B.
To solve for this r value, I use numerical optimization (the bisection method)
to minimize the error function shown in Eq. 33. Here CCompustat and Cmodel are
Compustat and modeled CEO pay ratios, respectively.
✏(r) =
   Cmodel   CCompustat   (33)
For each firm, the fitted value of r minimizes this error function. To ensure
that there are no large errors, I discard Compustat firms for which the best-fit
r parameter produces an error that is larger than ✏ = 0.01). Fitted results for
r are shown in Figure 30. Code implementing this method can be found in the
C++ header file fit_model.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
E.4.2 Generating a Pay Scaling Distribution
Once we have generated r parameters for every Compustat firm, the next step
is to fit a parameterized distribution to this data. For Compustat firms, the dis-
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B.  Modeling σE
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Figure 31: Modeling the Firm Pay Scaling Distribution
This figure visualizes the model used to simulate firm pay-scaling parameters (r). Panel
A shows the relation between r and firm employment for Compustat firms. For the
simulation, the distribution of r is modeled with the lognormal variate r0. Panel B
shows how the lognormal scale parameter  E (defined by Eq. 38) changes with firm
size. The straight line indicates the modeled relation. Panel C shows how the modeled
dispersion of ln(r0) declines with firm size, and how this relates to Compustat r0 data.
The 2  range indicates 2 standard deviations from the mean (on log-transformed data).
Panel D shows how the distribution of r for Compustat firms compares to the simulated
distribution achieved by applying the model to the same Compustat firms.
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persion of r is approximately lognormal, and tends to decline with firm size (see
Figure 31A). I model r as a shifted function of the lognormal variate r0:
r = 1+ lnN (r0) (34)
The lognormal variate r0 is defined by location parameter µ and scale pa-
rameter  . While µ is assumed to be constant for all firms,   is a function of
firm size E:
r0(E) = lnN (r0;µ, E) (35)
I use the tuned Compustat data to solve for the parameters µ and  . We first
transform Compustat r values using Eq. 36 to get the Compustat distribution of
r0:
r0 = r   1 (36)
The best-fit value for µ is defined by taking the mean of ln(r0):
µ= ln(r0) (37)
Similarly, we can solve for the best-fit value for   by taking the standard devia-
tion of ln(r0). However, unlike µ, the value   will depend on the size range of
firms (E):
 E = SD [ ln(r0) ]E (38)
Figure 31B plots  E vs. E for logarithmically spaced size groupings of Com-
pustat firms. I model this relation using a log-linear regression. Figure 31C
shows how the modeled dispersion in r0 varies with firm size, and how this
compares to Compustat data.
Once we have fitted the parameters µ and  to the tuned Compustat data, we
can generate r values for simulated firms using equations 34 and 35. Although
the model is simple, it produces reasonably accurate results. To test this accu-
racy, we can apply the model to the same Compustat firms for which it is ‘tuned’.
For each Compustat firm, we use the method outlined above to stochastically
generate a pay-scaling value r. As Figure 31D shows, the resulting simulated
distribution of r fairly accurately reproduces the original data.
When we move from simulating Compustat firms to a real-world distribution
of firms, this model involves significant extrapolations for small firms. Why?
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The Compustat firm sample has very few observations for firms smaller than
100. And those small firms that are included in the sample are likely not repre-
sentative of the wider population, since they are small public firms. In the real
world, virtually all small firms are private. As with all extrapolations, we simply
do the best with the data that is available, while noting that better data might
render the extrapolation moot. The code implementing this model can be found
in the C++ header file r_sim.h, located in the Supplementary Material.
Note: When attempting to reproduce historical trends in US income inequality
(Fig. 18), I vary themean of the pay-scaling distribution bymultiplying the fitted
lognormal component by a random constant c:
r = 1+ c · lnN (r0) (39)
E.5 Base-Level Mean Pay
As with the pay-scaling parameter, base level mean pay varies across firms. How
should it vary? Again, I restrict the variation of this parameter in a two-step
process. I first ‘tune’ the model to Compustat data. This results in a distribution
of base pay specific to Compustat firms. I then fit this data with a parameterized
distribution, from which simulation parameters are randomly chosen.
E.5.1 Fitting Compustat Base Level Pay
Having already fitted a hierarchical pay structure to each Compustat firm (in the
process of finding r), we can use this data to estimate base pay for each firm.
To do this, we set up a ratio between base level pay ( I¯1) and firm mean pay ( I¯T)
for both the model and Compustat data:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯CompustatT
=
I¯ model1
I¯ modelT
(40)
The modeled ratio between base pay and firm mean pay ( I¯ model1 / I¯
model
T ) is
independent of the choice of base pay. This is because the modeled firm mean
pay is actually a function of base pay (see Eq. 23 and 24). If we run the model
with I¯ model1 = 1, then Eq. 40 reduces to:
I¯ Compustat1
I¯ CompustatT
=
1
I¯ modelT
(41)
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Figure 32: Modeling Firm Base Level Mean Pay
This figure shows the distribution of fitted base level mean pay for Compustat firms
(histogram). I model this data with a gamma distribution, from which simulated
firm base mean pay is randomly drawn.
We can then rearrange Eq. 41 to solve for an estimated base pay for each
Compustat firm ( I¯ Compustat1 ):
I¯ Compustat1 =
I¯ CompustatT
I¯ modelT
(42)
Code implementing this method is found in the C++ header file fit_model.h,
located in the Supplementary Material.
E.5.2 Generating a Base Pay Distribution
Once each Compustat firm has a fitted value for base-level mean pay, we fit this
data with a parametric distribution which is then used to stochastically generate
base-level mean pay for the simulation. Since Compustat data is comprised of
observations over multiple years, in order to aggregate this data into a single
distribution, we must account for inflation. Rather than use a price index like
the GDP deflator, I divide all firmmean pay data by the average Compustat mean
pay in the appropriate year. Since our simulation is concerned only with relative
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Figure 33: Density estimates for Intra-Hierarchical Level Pay Dispersion
Parameter  
This figure shows the distribution of the lognormal scale parameter , which determines
pay dispersion within all hierarchical levels of all firms. The distribution is calculated
using the bootstrap method.
incomes (rather than absolute incomes) no pertinent information is lost in this
process.
I model the Compustat firm base pay distribution with a gamma distribution
(Fig. 32). Note that because the Compustat data has a bimodal structure (that
I do not aim to replicate), the gamma distribution is not a particularly strong
fit. Nonetheless the gamma model closely replicates the inequality of firm base
pay (which has a Gini index of roughly 0.35). Code implementing this model
can be found in the C++ header file base_pay_sim.h (in the Supplementary
Material).
E.6 Intra-Hierarchical Level Income Dispersion
Intra-hierarchical level income dispersion is modeled with a lognormal distri-
bution, with the amount of inequality determined by the scale parameter  . I
estimate   from the case-study data shown in Figure 23C. This data uses the
Gini index as the metric for dispersion.
To estimate  , we first calculate the mean Gini index of all data (G¯). We
then use Eq. 43 to calculate the value  , which corresponds to the lognormal
scale parameter that would produce a lognormal distribution with an equivalent
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Gini index. This equation is derived from the definition of the Gini index of a
lognormal distribution: G = erf( /2).
  = 2 · erf 1(G¯) (43)
The model proceeds on the assumption that   is constant for all hierarchi-
cal levels within all firms. Because the case-study sample size is small, there is
considerable uncertainty in these values. I quantify this uncertainty using the
bootstrap method [112], which involves repeatedly resampling the case-study
data (with replacement) and then estimating the parameter   from this resam-
pled data.
Figure 33 shows the probability density distribution resulting from this boot-
strap analysis. In order to incorporate this uncertainty, I run the model many
times, with each run using a different bootstrapped value for  . Code imple-
menting this method can be found in the C++ header file boot_sigma.h, lo-
cated in the Supplementary Material.
E.7 Summary of Model Structure
The model is implemented in C++ using a modular design. Each major task is
carried out by a separate function that is defined in a corresponding header file.
Table 9 summarizes this structure sequentially in the order that functions are
called. In each step, I briefly summarize the action that is performed, giving
reference to the section where this action is described in detail.
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Table 9: Model High-Level Structure
Step Action Reference Section Parameter(s) Header File(s)
1 Bootstrap case-study data E.2, E.6 a, b,  
boot_span.h
boot_sigma.h
2
Get Compustat base-level
employment
E.3 E1 base_fit.h
3
Fit Compustat pay-scaling
parameters
E.4.1 r fit_model.h
4
Get Compustat base-level
mean pay
E.5.1 I1 fit_model.h
5
Generate power law firm size
distribution
E.1 ↵ rpld.h
6
Get simulation base-level
employment
E.3 E1 base_fit.h
7
Simulate pay-scaling
parameter distribution by
fitting Compustat data
E.4.2 r r_sim.h
8
Simulate base mean pay
distribution by fitting
Compustat data
E.5.2 I1 base_pay_sim.h
9 Run hierarchy model D all model.h
Notes: Model code makes extensive use of Armadillo, an open-source C++ linear algebra library [113].
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F The Adjusted Hierarchy Model
The hierarchy model tends to underestimate US income inequality. I think that
this is caused by the model’s reliance on Compustat Firm data (see Appendix E),
which is biased towards large firms. The result is that the model likely has too lit-
tle inter-firm income dispersion. Here I present the results of an adjusted model
in which inter-firm income dispersion is increased so that the model closely re-
produces US macro-level data.
As outlined in Appendix E, inter-firm income dispersion is modeled by fit-
ting a gamma distribution to Compustat data. The gamma distribution has the
following probability density function:
p(x) =
1
  (k)✓ k
· xk 1 · e k/✓ (44)
In the original model, the parameters k and ✓ are both determined by empirical
data. In the adjusted model, I introduce a fudge-factor c that allows me to adjust
the fitted k parameter by a constant amount:
kadjust = c · kfit (45)
The adjusted model then uses the parameter kadjust instead of kfit. All of the
model’s other parameters remain constant. Note that for c > 1, inter-firm dis-
persion is decreased (relative to the original model). For c < 1, inter-firm dis-
persion is increased. I choose the value c so that the adjusted model produces
the best match to US data. Model results for c = 0.5 are shown in Figure 34 in
the same format as the original model was presented in Figure 4. By increasing
inter-firm dispersion, we significantly improve the fit of the model to the body
of the US distribution of income. Note that the adjusted model’s Gini index is
significantly higher than in the original model, and now better matches US data.
Results in the tail remain virtually unchanged. (This is expected, since hierarchy
shapes the tail).
F.1 Hierarchical Redistribution with the Adjusted Model
Because the hierarchy model tends to underestimate US income inequality, the
hierarchical redistribution model tends to be shifted to the left relative to US
empirical data (see Fig. 18). As shown in Figure 35, by using the adjusted
model to calculate hierarchical redistribution, this problem disappears. Note,
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Figure 34: Adjusted Model Income Distribution vs. US Data
This figure compares various aspects of the adjustedmodel’s
income distribution to US data over the years 1992-2015.
The adjusted model has increased inter-firm income disper-
sion relative to the original model. Panel A shows the Gini
index, with two different US sources — the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Panel B shows the top 1% income share, using data from 17
different time series. Panel C shows the results of fitting a
power law distribution to the top 1% of incomes (where ↵
is the scaling exponent). Panel D plots the income density
curve with mean income normalized to 1 (using data from
the CPS). Panels E, F, and G use IRS data to construct the
Lorenz curve, cumulative distribution, and complementary
cumulative distribution (respectively). The cumulative dis-
tribution shows the proportion of individuals with income
less than the given x value. The complementary cumula-
tive distribution shows the proportion of individuals with
income greater than the given x value. Note the log scale
on the x-axis for these last two plots. For sources and meth-
ods, see Appendix A.
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Figure 35: The Adjusted Hierarchical Redistribution Model vs. US Data
This figure compares adjusted model results to historical trends in US income distri-
bution. The adjusted model has increased inter-firm income dispersion relative to the
original model. Model results are produced by varying the hierarchical pay-scaling pa-
rameter, indicated by color. Each colored point represents a single model iteration. US
empirical data is shown in black, with horizontal error lines indicating the range of 17
different estimates for the top 1% income share. The point indicates the median of these
estimates. Panel A plots the CEO pay ratio against the top 1% share, while panel B plots
the dividend share of national income against the top 1% share. Panel C plots the fitted
power law exponent of the top 1% of incomes against the top 1% income share. For
sources and methods, see Appendix A.
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however, that increasing inter-firm dispersion does not fix the model/empirical
discrepancy in the slope of the dividends vs. top 1% relation (Fig. 35B).
F.2 Adjusting the Capitalist Gradient Model
The capitalist gradient model is built on the following functional relation be-
tween hierarchical power (P) and capitalist income fraction (Kfrac):
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) (46)
Recall that hierarchical power is defined as the number of subordinates + 1.
All individuals with no subordinates therefore have hierarchical power P = 0.
Since ln(1) = 0, all these individuals will have exactly zero capitalist income. By
convention, income distribution is usually only tabulated for non-zero incomes.
Thus these individuals are excluded.
In the adjusted capitalist gradient model, I introduce an adjustment to the
capitalist income fraction equation:
Kfrac = 0.05 ln(P) + ✏ (47)
Here ✏ is a constant very close to zero. Its effect is only felt when P = 1. Instead
of getting Kfrac = 0, we get Kfrac = ✏. What does this do? It effectively endows
individuals who previously had zero capitalist income with a tiny amount of
capitalist income (a few dollars). The effect may seem insignificant, but it has
an important impact on the capitalist income distribution. As shown in Figure
36, the adjusted model better matches the US data.
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Figure 36: The Adjusted Capitalist Gradient Model vs. US Data
This figure shows the results of an adjusted capitalist gradient model. The adjusted
model allows individuals with a hierarchical power of 1 to have a small capitalist income.
This significantly changes the model’s Lorenz curve and Gini index. Panel A shows the
original capitalist gradient model’s Lorenz curve plotted against US data. Panel B shows
the adjusted capitalist gradient model’s Lorenz curve. Panel C compares the Gini indexes
of the original and adjusted models to US data. Panel D shows the top 1% income share.
US data is from the IPUMS database. See Appendix A.
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G A Null Effect Model for Top Incomes and Firm Size
One of the predictions of the hierarchy model is that top incomes should be con-
centrated at the top of large institutions. To test this prediction, I look at the size
distribution of firms associated with top incomes. Here I develop a null-effect
model. This model is what we would expect to find if there is absolutely no re-
lation between firm membership and income. In the null-effect case, we should
find that the size distribution of firms associated with top earners is exactly the
same as the size distribution of firms associated with the general population.
To determine the null-effect we must find the size distribution of firms as-
sociated with the general population. Before doing so, some clarification is in
order. What we are talking about is the size distribution of firms associated with
individuals. As shown in Figure 37, this is quite different from the firm size
distribution. To determine the firm size distribution, each firm is counted once.
However, when we map firm size to individuals, each firm is weighted by the
number of individuals within it. When we do this, we are really looking at the
distribution of employment by firm size. So what is this distribution? Let’s find
out.
If we randomly select an individual from the private sector population, let
p(ix) be the probability that this individual is associated with a firm of size x .
This probability will determine the size distribution of firms associated with a
random sample of individuals. Let p(x) be the probability of randomly selecting
a firm of size x from the firm population. Using Figure 37 for guidance, we can
see that p(ix) is given by:
p(ix)⇠ x · p(x) (48)
If we know p(x)— the probability distribution of firms — we can use Eq. 48
to predict the firm size distribution associated with a random sample of indi-
viduals. Let’s do so for the United States. The US firm size distribution can
be approximated by the power law distribution p(x) ⇠ x 2 (see Appendix E).
Substituting this into Eq. 48 gives:
p(ix)⇠ x 1 (49)
Because firm sizes generally span many orders of magnitude, it is more con-
venient to look at the log transformation of Eq. 49. Therefore, we want to know
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Figure 37: Mapping Firm Sizes to Individuals
This figure illustrates the mapping of firm size to individuals. Each box represents a
firm, with size indicated above. The mapping of firm size to individuals appears below
each firm. Let p(x) be the probability of randomly selecting a firm of size x from the firm
population. Let p(ix) be the probability of randomly selecting an individual associated
with a firm of size x (from th individual population). Noting that each firm size x
appears x times in the individual-to-firm mapping, we can state that p(ix)/ x · p(x).
the probability density for p(ln ix). To find this, we use the standard change-of-
variable function for a probability density:
f y = fx
 
x(y)
  ·    x 0(y)    (50)
We let f y = p(ln ix) and fx = c · x 1 (where c is constant). The transformation
function is y = ln x . We then note that x(y) = ey and x 0(y) = ey . Substituting
into Eq. 50 gives:
f y = c · (ey) 1 · ey = c (51)
Since f y = p(ln ix), we can state that p(ln ix) = c, the uniform distribution. If
we randomly draw a sample of individuals from the US private sector, we predict
that their associated firm size distribution will be log-uniform. This is the null-
effect. If there is absolutely no relation between income and firm membership,
we should find that the size distribution of firms associated with top incomes (in
the US) is log-uniformly distributed.
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H How Hierarchy Generates the Power-Law Tail
Although the hierarchy model is not tuned to do so, it reproduces (with good
accuracy) the power-law scaling of top US incomes. What is the mechanism at
work here? It turns out that the basic mechanism was theorized by Lydall [63]
in the late 1950s (and then largely ignored thereafter). It relies on the two
contrapuntal exponential tendencies of hierarchical organization: (1) the share
of employment tends to decrease exponentially with hierarchical rank; (2) in-
come tends to increase exponentially with rank. These two opposing tendencies
interact to produce a power law distribution of income (in the tail).
This mechanism is a specific case of a more general method. A power law
will be created any time we exponentially transform an exponential distribution
[114]. The generative mechanism works as follows. Suppose we have some
quantity y that is exponentially distributed (here a is a negative constant):
p(y)⇠ eay (52)
In the case of hierarchical class structure, this would be the probability of
finding someone with a hierarchical rank y . What causes employment to be dis-
tributed (approximately) exponentially by rank? It is a generic result of branch-
ing hierarchical structure, in which each superior has control over multiple sub-
ordinates. If the span of control is constant, employment will decrease exponen-
tially with rank as one moves up the hierarchy. See Figure 1 for an idealized
picture.
Suppose that we have another variable, x , that is also exponentially related
to y:
x = eby (53)
In the context of hierarchical organization, x would be income, which increases
exponentially with rank. Why does income have this scaling behavior? Her-
bert Simon suggests that it results from social norms [62]. My own view is that
it is caused by the power asymmetries that are innate to hierarchical organi-
zation [115]. Hierarchical power (measured by the number of subordinates)
tends to increase exponentially with rank. If income is a function of hierarchical
power, then it too should increase exponentially with rank.
Moving on with our derivation, the question we want to know is this: how
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is income x distributed? To find out, we use the change of variable formula to
get fx , the density function of x:
fx = f y
 
y(x)
  ·    y 0(x)    (54)
We let f y = eay . Since x = eby , we note that y(x) =
1
b ln x and y
0(x) = 1/bx .
Substituting into the change of variable formula gives:
fx = e
a
b ln x · 1
bx
=
1
b
xa/b 1 (55)
Thus the variate x (income) has a power law distribution with exponent
↵= a/b 1. A caveat here is that the derivation assumes that both x and y are
continuous. If y represents rank, then it will be a discrete variable. This will
result in a non-continuous distribution of x .
To reiterate, hierarchical organization creates a power law distribution be-
cause of two contrapuntal, exponential tendencies: (1) employment tends to
decrease exponentially with rank; and (2) income tends to increase exponen-
tially with rank. Figure 38 highlights this contrapuntal behavior in the hierar-
chy model. As expected, the hierarchical employment distribution has a bottom-
heavy pyramid shape (Fig. 38A). The vast majority of people work in low ranks,
and only a tiny elite occupy top positions. The inset panel highlights the exponen-
tial nature of the employment distribution. Here, the logarithm of hierarchical
employment share is plotted on the y-axis, against rank on the x-axis. With this
log transformation, a pure exponential function will appear as a straight line.
Figure 38B shows the model’s hierarchical pay structure. To make compar-
ison easy, I have normalized all income so that the base-level income is equal
to one. As expected, hierarchical pay has an inverted pyramid shape. Average
income at the top of the hierarchy dwarfs (by several orders of magnitude) that
at the bottom. To highlight the exponential nature of this relation, the inset plot
shows the logarithm of income plotted against rank. Again, a pure exponential
function will appear as a straight line.
Note that neither relative employment nor pay has a purely exponential rela-
tion with rank. This is a design feature of the model, stemming from case study
evidence. In this data, income tends to increase supra-exponentially (faster than
an exponential) with rank. Conversely, employment tends to decrease supra-
exponentially with rank (see Appendix B and D for details). In any case, when
we combine these two supra-exponential tendencies, the result still seems to be
(roughly) a power law distribution of income in the model’s tail. (I have not, as
yet, worked out how this happens.)
How Hierarchy Generates the Power-Law Tail 92
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●−4
−2
0
2
1 3 5 7 9 11
Rank
log
(E
)
1
3
5
7
9
11
50 25 0 25 50
Share of Employment (%)
Hi
era
rch
ica
l R
an
k
A.  Employment Share By Rank
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0
1
2
3
4
1 3 5 7 9 11
Rank
log
(I)
1
3
5
7
9
11
1000 500 0 500 1000
Relative Income (base = 1)
Hi
era
rch
ica
l R
an
k
B.  Mean Income By Rank
Figure 38: The Hierarchy Model’s Contrapuntal Exponential Tendencies
This figure shows the two contrapuntal exponential tendencies associated with the hi-
erarchy model’s class structure. Panel A shows the model’s aggregate distribution of
employment by hierarchical rank. The bottom-heavy shape results from firm’s hierar-
chical structure (in conjunction with the firm size distribution). The inset graph shows
the logarithm of employment share log(E), plotted against rank. The curved relation
indicates that employment declines with rank slightly faster than an exponential func-
tion. Panel B shows the model’s mean pay by hierarchical rank (normalized so that
the base level =1). The inset graph shows the logarithm of income log I against rank.
The curved relation indicates that income increases with rank slightly faster than an
exponential function.
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Figure 39: Hierarchical Class Structure and the Distribution of Income
This figure shows the distribution of income for each hierarchical rank in the hierarchy
model. To clearly show the distribution tail, I have used a log-log transformation. In
each panel, a rank-specific income distribution is shown in color. For comparison, I also
show the model’s aggregate income distribution (black). The shaded region indicates
the top 1% of incomes (in the aggregate model distribution). To interpret this plot,
look at how closely each rank-specific distribution comes to the aggregate distribution.
The closer the two are, the greater the rank’s contribution to income distribution at that
point. The power law right tail (evident as the straight line in the aggregate distribution)
is jointly created by ranks five and up.
To get a better picture of how this process works, we turn to Figure 39. Here
I show how the model’s hierarchical class structure creates the tail of the income
distribution. Each panel shows the distribution of income of a specific hierarchi-
cal rank. Note that I use a log-log transformation — this allows us to better see
the tail of the distribution. To allow comparison, every panel also shows the
model’s aggregate income distribution. How do we interpret this plot? Look at
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how closely each rank-based distribution comes to the main distribution. Where
the two are close, it indicates that the particular hierarchical rank contributes a
great deal to the distribution of income at that point. To get a sense for where the
tail of the income distribution is located, I have shaded the top 1% of incomes
(in the aggregate model distribution). We can see that the tail of the distribution
is created by ranks 5 and above.
The take-home message here is that hierarchical class structure can serve as
a generative mechanism for creating the well-recognized Pareto scaling of top
incomes.
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